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Liberty from On High: The Growing Reliance on a
Centralized Judiciary to Protect Individual Liberty
Patick M. Garryl
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE one overriding theme used to describe the modern Supreme Court
is its revival of federalism. Ever since the New Deal era, "federalism
concerns had been largely dormant in the Court's decisions."3 However,
under the leadership of the late Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court has at-
tempted to resuscitate the constitutional role and authority of the states by
revitalizing constraints on national power such as the Tenth Amendment
and state sovereign immunity.4 Through a wide array of cases employing
both the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, the Court has at least some-
what stalled the constitutional drift of power from the states to the federal
government that began in the 1930s.
The doctrine of federalism refers to the balancing of power betweens
the states and the federal government. The Constitution establishes a
dual governmental structure consisting of state and national governments.
Although its purpose was to create a strong national government, the Con-
I Associate Professor, University of South Dakota School of Law.
2 William H. Pryor, Jr., Madison's Double Security: In Defense of Federalism, the Separation
of Powers, and the Rehnquist Court, 53 ALA. L. REV. 1 167, 1167 (2002). For the first time since
the post-New Deal era, the Court has struck down congressional acts on the grounds that
they infringed on state powers and rights. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598
(2000) (Violence Against Women Act); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (zooo) (Age
Discrimination in Employment Act); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 0997) (Brady
Handgun Violence Prevention Act); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (Gun-Free
School Zones Act).
3 Casey L. Westover, Structural Interpretation and the New Federalism: Finding the Proper
Balance Between State Soveregnty and Federal Supremacy, 88 MARQ. L. REv. 693, 693 (2005).
4 See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 5 17 U.S. 4 4 (1996); New York v. United States,
505 U.S. 144 (1992).
5 See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971 ) (suggesting that the constitutional scheme
envisions a federal structure in which states are equal partners with the national government).
As David Walker describes it: "[Flederalism is a governmental system that includes a central
government and at least one major subnational tier of governments; that assigns significant
substantive powers to both levels initially by the provisions of a written constitution; and that
succeeds over time in sustaining a territorial division of powers by judicial, operational, repre-
sentational, and political means." DAVID B. WALKER, ThE REBIRTH OF FEDERALISM: SLOUCHING
TOWARD WASHINGTON 20 (995).
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stitution also sought to preserve the independent integrity and lawmaking
authority of the states.
During the nineteenth century and throughout the early twentieth, the
Court adhered to a "federalist vision," under which it "made substantial
use of the Tenth Amendment as a limit on congressional power."7 But
after 1937, the Court switched positions, adopting a nationalist approach.
Facilitating the expansion of federal powers following the New Deal, the
Court from 1937 to roughly the 1990s "served generally as a major force for
centripetalism .... "' During that time, no federal laws were held to exceed
Congress' Commerce Clause powers, and only one federal law was ruled to
violate the Tenth Amendment.10
After almost sixty years of dormancy, federalism made a constitutional
comeback in the 1990s. An observer describes this comeback as "a slow
6 Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1466 (1987) [here-
inafter Amar, Sovereignty]. Robert Nagel outlines the benefits of federalism: improving the
chances that "local needs and values will be served[,] ... the possibility of certain kinds of
competition among governments, the opportunity for a wide range of entry points for po-
litical participation, and the option of 'exit' for the disaffected .... " ROBERT F. NAGEL, ThE
IMPLOSION OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM 12 (2OO1).
7 Erwin Chemerinsky, The Federalism Revolution, 31 N.M. L. REv. 7, 8 (2ooo). For in-
stance, the Court ruled that a congressional act banning the shipment of goods made by child
labor violated the Tenth Amendment. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 276 (1918), over-
ruledby United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. ioo, 116-17 (1941). The Tenth Amendment prohibits
the national government from exercising non-delegated powers that will infringe on the law-
making autonomy of the states; it states that "[tihe powers not delegated to the United States
by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively,
or to the people." U.S. CONsT. amend. X.
8 Chemerinsky, supra note 7.
9 WALKER, supra note 5, at 27. Whenever the Court was presented with challenges to the
"expansion of national authority" during this period, it "almost always upheld these actions."
Id. The chief exception to this rule is the Court's decision in NationalLeague of Cities v. Usery,
which in turn proved to be aberrational. Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 0976),
overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
1o Nat'lLague of Cities, 426 U.S. at 852 (holding that Congress exceeded its authority
when it passed legislation that would "operate to directly displace the States' freedom to
structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions"). The Commerce
Clause states: "The Congress shall have Power ... To regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." U.S. CoNsT. art I, § 8. Yet
during this period following 1937, according to Professor Nagel, the Court continued to praise
the "principle of limited national power [even as] it was subordinating [that principle] in the
cases it was deciding." NAGEL, supra note 6, at 25.
I I The Rehnquist Court's federalism decisions have been described as the "New
Federalism." Westover, supra note 3, at 725. This "New Federalism" attempts to counter
the long drift toward an imbalanced system greatly favoring the national government over
the states. It also seeks to recognize the fact that for most of American history "the states
have been the chief architects... of the welter of servicing, financial, institutional, and juris-
dictional arrangements" of the public sector. WALKER, supra note 5, at 249. States have also
"provided the means by which most of domestic U.S. governance is conducted and nearly all
domestic policies are implemented." Id.
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but steady trend towards curbing the power of the federal government
under the limitations of the Interstate Commerce Clause and the Tenth
Amendment." Others depict it as one in which the Court has "assumed
an aggressive stance in safeguarding states from perceived overreaching
by the federal government." This stance contrasts with the Warren era,
when the Court "exerted a generally centralizing influence throughout
nearly all of the period."'
' 4
Despite the modern Court's dramatic move toward political federal-
ism, it has not made a corresponding move in the area of individual rights.
Rather than encouraging a decentralized rights-federalism, in which states
have greater leeway to balance social values with a more particularized view
of individual rights, the Court has consolidated the matter at the national
level, with the Court dictating to the entire nation a uniform view and ap-
plication of individual rights. Thus, while there has been decentralization
regarding congressional regulation of the states, there has been no decen-
tralization regarding the judiciary's dictates and formulation of individual
rights. In other words, the Court's "federalism revolution" has coincided
with an opposite move regarding individual rights, where centralization has
occurred despite the growing diversity of the United States.
16
In connection with individual rights, the Court embarked on a central-
izing course during the Warren era that has continued up to the present.
With issues ranging from how best to protect religious freedom; what limits
should be placed on abortion; how convicted murderers may be punished;
whether pornographic speech can be kept from minors; and how public
religious symbols may be displayed, the Court has refused to permit much
diversity in state policies and has ruled that only it can act with one uniform
mandate to the entire country. The Court has monopolized constitutional
12 Robert Ward Shaw, The States, Balanced Budgets, and Fundamental Shifts in Federalism,
82 N.C. L. REV. 1 195, 1217 (2004).
13 A. Brooke Overby, Our New Commercial Law Federalism, 76 TEMP. L. REV. 297, 305
(zoo3). In the modern era, courts may have to be more aggressive in upholding federalism
because of the changed realities of American life. The Framers believed that there was actu-
ally a greater risk that "the states would encroach on national authority than that the central
government would usurp state authority." NAGEL, supra note 6, at 5. It was thought that the
loyalty of citizens would be first and foremost to their state governments, and that this loyalty
would then make the states "dangerous rivals to the power of the Union." Id. (quoting THE
FEDERALIST No. 17, at izo (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)). This state
loyalty, however, no longer exists and thus cannot be counted on to protect federalism.
14 WALKER, supra note 5, at 1o. Nor was there any "major retreat" from this nationalizing
position by the Burger Court. Id.
15 In this respect, according to Robert Nagel, the Court has proved "hostile to the basic
impulses underlying a robust form of federalism." NAGEL, supra note 6, at 69.
16 Consequently, government authority has not been decentralized as much as the "new
federalism" might suggest.
17 See WALKER, supra note 5, at 177-78.
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interpretation, precluding states from reaching their own consensus on or
accommodation of individual rights.
This nationalization of issues once left to the states has not always been
the most preferred strategy of the Court. In Employment Division v. Smith,
for instance, the Court's ruling that it would no longer enforce the Free Ex-
ercise Clause as strictly as it once had suggested that responsibility would
be shifted to the states to protect religious freedoms.1 8 Since states could
now pass neutral laws of general applicability, even if they burdened reli-
gious exercise, states could largely decide for themselves whether religious
observances should be exempt from laws of general applicability.'9 And,
as one court recognized nearly a century ago about the liberty-protecting
structures of the Constitution, the rights of each American citizen, who is
necessarily a resident of a state, "depends wholly upon laws of the state,
and that as to a great number of matters he must still look to the states
to protect him in the enjoyment of life, liberty, property, and the pursuit
. . ,,20
of happiness." However, the decentralization of rights as suggested by
Smith has not occurred; instead, the Court has continued to monopolize the
definition and dictates of individual rights.
The alternative to this high-court monopolization lies in the Consti-
tution's structural provisions designed to protect liberty. These structural
provisions-e.g., federalism and separation of powers-offer a constitu-
tional path for the decentralization of rights and a greater reliance on the
democratic process to protect liberty. In fact, the Constitution's structural
design of American democracy was intended by the Framers to be the pri-
mary protection of individual liberty, even more so than judicial enforce-
ment of a specified set of substantive individual rights. This structural
path to liberty is outlined in Part II of this Article-a path that offers a
more democratic means of protecting individual rights in an increasingly
diverse nation. In Part III, the Article offers examples of how the Court has
centralized the whole area of individual liberty, despite the Constitution's
original conception of how such liberty would be safeguarded. And in Part
IV, the Article examines how this judicial centralization of rights, particu-
larly through the use of substantive due process, has affected the political
process, and how it will continue to affect that process in the future.
18 Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding that a law does not violate
the Free Exercise Clause even if it requires conduct that is counter to one's religious beliefs
where the law is otherwise neutral and generally applicable).
19 See Eugene Volokh, A Common-Law Atodelfor Religious Exemptions, 46 UCLA L. REv.
1465, 1468 (1999).
20 United States v. Moore, 129 E 630, 632 (C.C.N.D. Ala. 19o4).
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II. A STRUCTURAL PATH TOWARD DECENTRALIZED LIBERTY
The Constitution's embodiment of the structural principles of federalism
is designed not just to create a workable government but to create one that
protects individual rights.21 To the Framers, the primary justification of
federalism was the role of the states as guardians against possible federal22
tyranny. By diluting the power of the centralized national government,
federalism restricts the opportunities for the abuse of power. Furthermore,
by maintaining a separate governmental watchdog layer in the states, fed-
eralism provides a built-in mechanism to combat any overreaching by the
23
national government. According to the Framers, the states could mount
popular uprisings against any tyrannical abuses by the national govern-
ment.24 Alexander Hamilton argued that individuals who felt their rights
were violated by the central government could use the state governments
"as the instrument of redress." Infringements on liberty caused by a po-
tentially tyrannical national government could be prevented by state gov-
ernments standing "ready to rally their citizens and lead them in opposi-
tion.""
For a century and a half, the Framers' commitment to federalism was
preserved in constitutional doctrine. But during the New Deal period,
2 1 Amar, Sovereignty, supra note 6, at 1426. An advantage of federalism is that people of
different views can gather in different states with different policies. For instance, with respect
to sexual rights, federalism allows people to move to the locales most hospitable to their par-
ticular orientations or proclivities.
22 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 28, at I81 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) (arguing that the states "will, in all possible contingencies, afford complete security
against invasions of the public liberty by the national authority"); see also AKHIL REED AMAR,
THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION (1998) (hereinafter AMAR, THE BILL OF
RIGHTS) (arguing that bolstering the states as bulwarks against federal tyranny was the pri-
mary motivation behind the adoption of the Bill of Rights).
23 The Framers believed that the states would serve to check any encroachments by
the national government on the liberties of the people. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 5 1, at
322-23 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., I961). State governments would stand ready
"to sound the alarm to the people" about instances where the federal government exceeded
its powers. Id. at No. 44, at 286.
24 Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back Into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, oo
COLUM. L. REV. 215, 215 (2000). Similarly, the modern Court's resurgent interest in preserv-
ing federalism is driven by a "concern for individual liberty." Pryor, supra note 2, at 1 177. As
Justice O'Connor stated, "[tihe Constitution does not protect the sovereignty of States for the
benefit of the States or state governments as abstract political entities," but rather "for the
protection of individuals." New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992).
25 T E FEDERALIST NO. 28, at 181 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
26 Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building Government in ConstitutionalLaw, 118 HARV. L. REV.
915, 938 (2005). To the Framers, "the primary safeguards against government tyranny were
architectural." Id. at 919. But, this ability was possible only if state governments possessed
considerable influence and leverage over federal officials to prevent federal overreaching. Id.
at 938.
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the notion of protecting liberty through the maintenance of limited and
divided government gave way to the desire to ensure economic security
through a powerful and activist central government. Although the Fram-
ers had sought political freedom by creating structural divisions within the
government to prevent the concentration of government power," the New
Dealers believed they could preserve liberty solely through the judiciary's
enforcement of specified individual freedoms. During the Warren era,
however, the Court turned almost completely away from any structural
analyses of individual rights, instead focusing strictly on judicial enforce-
ment of particular substantive rights."
Under the scheme of the Constitution, liberty is seen as the result of
structural limitations on government power, not as the result of affirmative
governmental edicts.z9 Thus, as originally framed, the Constitution pro-
tected liberty through a government of structurally restrained powers, not
through reliance on the courts to enforce a judicially defined set of insular
individual rights.3° The Framers, committed to the notion that rights pre-
ceded government, drafted a Constitution that sought not to lay out spe-
cific individual rights, but to "devise institutional mechanisms" that would
protect individual liberty in all its various forms.31
In the eighteenth century, there was a fear of individual dependency
on government. This dependency related to more than just economic de-
pendency; it also involved dependence on an undemocratic institution to
protect liberty. Moreover, rather than on what affirmative "rights" were
owed individuals by the government, the emphasis was on individual re-
sponsibility to democratic society. Only through a structural approach to
liberty could this responsibility be incorporated.
27 M.J.C. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 14 (1967).
28 See Westover, supra note 3, at 695, 699.
29 See ERVIN H. POLLACK, JURISPRUDENCE: PRINCIPLES AND APPLICATIONS 72 (1979).
30 Id. at 74. As Robert Nagel argues, the Constitution reflects the belief that "the pres-
ervation of broad regulatory power at the state and local level would ensure a sufficient supply
of centrifugal political energy to maintain a national government of limited powers [and that
this] would help preserve the people's liberties." NAGEL, supra note 6, at 16.
31 See Randy E. Barnett, Why You ShouldReadMy Book Anyhow: A Reply to TrevorMorrison,
90 CORNELL L. REV. 873, 879 (2OO5). Structural features like limited government, federalism,
and separation of powers are meant to subject government officials "to legal constraints on
their exercise of power that will effectively protect the rights retained by the people." Id. at
882. The Framers' focus was on the larger structure of governmental organization and power,
rather than on a fixed list of specific individual rights.
32 Since human beings exchange part of their natural liberty for the protections of civil
law when joining a society, rights cannot then be measured by this pre-society state; nor can
individuals be viewed apart from the duties and responsibilities they owe to the civil society
in which they live. See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, I COMMENTARIES *125. Moreover, any effort
to strengthen liberty must pay close attention "to the structures of civil society." MARY ANN
GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE 135 (1991).
[Vol. 95
2006-20071 JUDICIAL CENTRALIZATION OF RIGHTS
Constitutional history suggests that the ratifiers of the Constitution be-
lieved that individual liberty would be protected more by the structural
features of the Constitution than by the particular freedoms listed in the
Bill of Rights. The state conventions that insisted on adding a Bill of Rights
specifically suggested the addition of two separate amendments: one de-
claring the principle of enumerated federal power with all non-delegated
power being reserved to the states, and the second declaring a rule of con-
33
struction limiting the interpretation of enumerated federal power. Lib-
erty was not entrusted to a list of substantive individual rights but to the
entire scheme or structure of the Constitution. This served to limit the1 4
scope of federal authority in ways that would protect individual liberty.
To the Framers, liberty would be protected through the decentralized po-
litical processes of the states, not through a nationalized set of uniform,
mandated rights handed down by the Supreme Court. However, during
the twentieth century, the Supreme Court "emerged in the public's under-
standin as the preeminent enforcer of limitations on the national govern-
ment."
IIl. THE CENTRALIZATION OF RIGHTS
A. Dictating Religious Expression in a Diverse Society
Through its individual rights decisions, the Court has nationalized its au-
thority over many aspects of American life, including religion, violent and
indecent speech through the media, sexual behavior and family relations,
and the line between privacy and community values. It has used its rights
doctrines to downgrade or overrule the democratic judgments of state and
local communities across the nation. In Texas v. Johnson, the Court struck
36down flag desecration statutes in forty-eight states. In McIntyre v. Ohio
Elections Commission, the Court invalidated bans on anonymous campaign
33 See Kurt T Lash, The LostJurisprudence of the Ninth Amendment, 83 TEX. L. REV. 597, 603
(2005). These suggested amendments would later become the Ninth and Tenth Amendments.
"One of the original purposes of the Ninth Amendment was to prevent the Bill of Rights from
being construed to suggest that congressional power extended to all matters except those
expressly restricted." Id. at 619.
34 The present situation, in which the courts are focused so primarily on satisfying spe-
cific individual claims, calls to mind de Tocqueville's warning of a society made up of discon-
nected individuals "endeavoring to procure the ... pleasures with which they glut their lives"
under the protection of the centralized power of the judiciary. 2 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE,
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 318 (Phillips Bradley ed., Henry Reeve trans., Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.
1945) (1840).
35 NAGEL, supra note 6, at 54. "In theory, if not in operation, judicial review has replaced
political pressure from the states as the primary check on federal overreaching." Id.
36 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
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literature that had been enacted in forty-nine states.37 In Stenbetgv. Carhart,
the Court struck down prohibitions on partial-birth abortions that were in
effect in thirty states." And in City of Chicago v. Morales, the Court undercut
vagrancy laws that had existed for over one hundred years.39
On the one hand, legal scholars employ the multicultural model to ad-
vocate a greater respect for America's cultural mix; yet on the other, they
assert a rigidly nationalistic approach to individual rights.'° The claim is
made that "the United States has one political community,' 'a ' and all rights
must be uniformly applied within this community.4 But, as reflected in
its contradiction to the multicultural movement, this rights-nationalization
goes against the inherent diversity of America. This tension is especially
evident in the way the courts have used individual rights doctrines to stifle
the religious life of local communities.
The Supreme Court has used the Establishment Clause to strike down
many local accommodations of religious exercise, including all kinds of43
public displays of religious symbols. Carving out a "dissenter's right"
from the Establishment Clause, the Court has given a constitutional trump
card to individuals who claim their rights have been violated by a prayer
delivered by a rabbi at a middle school graduation"; a creche displayed on
public grounds45 ; a prayer recited by a student prior to the start of a high
school football game ; and most recently by a plaque of the Ten Com-
mandments hanging in a courthouse. 47  This dissenter's right has been
uniformly applied throughout the whole nation, regardless of the religious
traditions or sensibilities of the local communities in which the religious
37 McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334,371 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
38 Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
39 See City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 103-04 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
40 See Hugo Rojas, Stop Cultural Exclusions (in Chile)!: Reflections on the Principle of
Multiculturalism, 55 FLA. L. REV. 121, 135 (2003).
41 Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41
UCLA L. REV. 903,945 (1994).
42 See id. at 948.
43 According to Professor Conkle, the Supreme Court has used the Establishment
Clause "to enforce a wavering, but relatively strict, separation of church and state at all levels
of American government." Daniel 0. Conkle, Toward a General Theory of the Establishment
Clause, 8z Nw. U. L. REV. I 13, 1117 (1988). As Justice Kennedy stated in County of Allegheny,
the Court has displayed "an unjustified hostility toward religion" and a "callous indiffer-
ence toward religious faith." County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 655, 664 (1989)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). According to the
Court in Lynch, when courts enforce a strict separation of church and state, they assault the
freedom of religious exercise as guaranteed in the First Amendment. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465
U.S. 668, 673 (1984).
44 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
45 County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. 573.
46 Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (zooo).
47 McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005).
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displays or expressions take place. It is a judicially created right that es-
sentially dictates the public role of religion in every community of every
state. Through enforcement of this right, the Supreme Court "arguably
[has] reduced the role of religion in public life, and the scope of religious
freedom in private life, to less than that intended by the framers and rati-
fiers of the First Amendment's religion clauses. 49
The Court's use of the endorsement test reveals the way in which the
Court has created and applied a nationalized Establishment Clause-based
dissenter's right. As Justice Kennedy wrote in criticism of the endorse-
ment test, it tends to foster a "jurisprudence of minutia. 50 For instance,
the creche display in .Lynch was constitutional because it was surrounded byS 51
clowns and reindeer, but the creche display in County of Allegheny was un-
constitutional because it was surrounded only by flowers and was located
on the Grand Staircase of the courthouse."2 Distinguishing the creche in
Allegheny from the one in Lynch, the Court examined the setting and found
that, unlike the elephants, clowns, and reindeer that surrounded the creche
in Lynch, nothing in the Allegheny display muted its religious message."
The endorsement test can easily descend into a judicial analysis of a
dissenter's feelings of exclusion or discomfort. Under such an analysis, a
dissenter can stop a public prayer inserted into a high school graduation
ceremony, even when that dissenter had no obligation to participate in the
prayer. The only pressure felt by the dissenter was the result of perhaps
some social discomfort for not participating, but there was no governmental
48 And these dissenter's rights are used to block the religious expressions of the larger
community.
49 Brian J. Serr, A Not-So-Neutral "Neutrality:" An Essay on the State of the Religion Clauses on
the Brink ofthe ThirdMillennium, 51 BAYLOR L. REV. 319,320 (1999). The Court's Establishment
Clause decisions "mandate a government 'neutrality' of hypersensitivity toward even the
most limited acknowledgments of religion in public life." Id.
50 County ofAllegheny, 492 U.S. at 674.
51 See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 671, 687 (1984).
52 County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 598-600. At the same time, the Court upheld another
holiday display also located on public property-a display that combined a forty-five-foot
Christmas tree and an eighteen-foot menorah. Id. at 587,617-18.
53 Id. at 598.
54 See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 580-84, 594-96 (1992) (stating "the government
may no more use social pressure to enforce orthodoxy than it may use more direct means").
The Court's decision in Santa Fe also concerns such "pressure." Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Doe, 530 U.S. 290,312 (2ooo). At issue in Santa Fe was a Texas school district's practice of hav-
ing a student, who was annually elected to the office of student council chaplain, "deliver[] a
prayer over the public address system before each varsity football game...." Id. at 294. This
practice was held by the Court to be a violation of the Establishment Clause. Id. at 317. The
Court also found that the prayer practice was coercive, insofar as objecting witnesses were
put into the position of either attending a personally offensive religious ritual or foregoing a
traditional gathering of the school community. Id. at 31 1.
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pressure to participate or threat of punishment for not participating."5 Yet
the Court's ruling used this discomfort by a single dissenter to transform a
prayer recitation into a state establishment of religion. 6 With such a rigid
and nationalized enforcement of these dissenter's rights, the Court has as-
sumed an almost dictatorial role in shaping the religious nature of soci-57
ety.
The judicial rulings on displays of the Ten Commandments illustrate
the way in which the Court has centralized within itself all power to dictate
the parameters of religious expression in public venues. Essentially, the
Court has enforced a rule of mandated neutrality, treating every commu-
nity of the nation the same as every other; despite the history or traditions
or sensibilities of that community; despite any contrary interpretations of
democratically elected bodies; and despite how the Ten Commandments
may have become part of a community's public life.
In McCreary Counly v. ACLU, the Court held unconstitutional a display
of the Ten Commandments in a county courthouse hallway.5 9 The Court
found that the purpose behind the display was religious rather than secular,
even though the county had altered and modified its displays on two differ-
ent occasions so as to give them an increasingly secular image.6 The third
display, entitled "The Foundations of American Law and Government,"
contained nine framed documents of equal size, including the Declaration
of Independence, the Bill of Rights, the Mayflower Compact, the lyrics of
the Star Spangled Banner, and the Ten Commandments, each of which was
accompanied by an educational statement about the document's historical
55 See Lee, 505 U.S. at 642 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("I see no warrant for expanding the
concept of coercion beyond acts backed by threat of penalty .....
56 See Santa Fe, 530 U.S. 29o; Lee, 505 U.S. 577.
57 See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (invalidating statute requiring the teach-
ing of creationism alongside the theory of evolution); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (in-
validating statutes authorizing a moment of silence at the beginning of the school day). Also,
the Court has invalidated legislation allowing publicly funded teachers to teach secular sub-
jects in religious schools. Sch. Dist of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373,388 (1985) (basing its
ruling at least in part on the fear that public school teachers might unwittingly "conform their
instruction to the environment in which they teach," thereby furthering the religious mission
of the school), overmled in part by Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235 (1997) (acknowledging
the portion of Grand Rapids addressing the "Shared Time" program is no longer good law).
58 The Court has used the endorsement test to measure the constitutionality of Ten
Commandments displays. For instance, in Stonev. Graham, the Court held that public schools
could not post the Ten Commandments in classrooms. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41
(198o). But since the Ten Commandments in Stone hung alone, an unanswered question
was whether they would still be unconstitutional if surrounded by other displays. Moreover,
another unresolved issue was whether the age and sensibilities of children made the display
unconstitutional, and thus whether a display seen by adults might be permissible.
59 McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005).
60 Id. at 869-72.
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and legal significance.6' Still, the Court effectively penalized the county for
its attempts to expand and modify the displays, ruling that such attempts
merely proved an initial and continuing religious purpose.6 2 The Court also
ruled that a "reasonable observer" would in fact reach certain specific un-
derstandings regarding the county's intent to endorse the Commandments'
63
religious message. According to the Court, an observer would somehow
read into all the documents contained in the third display a relious theme
highlighting and supporting that of the Ten Commandments.
The endorsement test, as first articulated by Justice O'Connor, focuses
on two different factors: the government's intention concerning the display,
and the perceived meaning of the display in the community.6 1 Consequent-
ly, the Court must undertake not only a subjective analysis of government
intent, but also an examination of the perceptions of the reasonable ob-
server to determine what message the government "actually conveyed. '66
This examination of what impressions viewers might have of some reli-
gious display is incapable of achieving certainty because it calls for judges
to make assumptions about the opinions that unknown people may have
received from certain religious speech or symbols.
61
In Freethought Society v. Chester County, the Third Circuit Court of Ap-
peals dealt with an array of factual issues relating to whether a "reasonable
observer" would view a Ten Commandments display as a governmental
68
endorsement of religion. The subject of the lawsuit was a plaque of the
Ten Commandments that had been erected in the county courthouse in
1920.69 Since that time, the county had done nothing to draw attention to
61 Id. at 856.
62 See id. at 873 ("If the observer had not thrown up his hands [at the third display],
he would probably suspect that the Counties were simply reaching for any way to keep a
religious document on the walls of courthouses constitutionally required to embody religious
neutrality.").
63 Id. at 847 ("The reasonable observer could only think that the Counties meant to
emphasize and celebrate the Commandments' religious message.").
64 Id. at 872-73. But, as the dissent pointed out, "[niothing stands behind the Court's as-
sertion that governmental affirmation of the society's belief in God is unconstitutional except
the Court's own say-so .... Id. at 889 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
65 See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring). According
to Justice O'Connor, "[endorsement sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders,
not full members of the political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that
they are insiders, favored members of the political community." Id. at 688.
66 See id. at 690.
67 See Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, andDoctrinal Illusions: EstabfishmentNeutrality
andthe "No Endorsement" Test, 86 MICH. L. REv. 266,301 (1987) (illustrating the test's ambigu-
ity by describing how two proponents of the test "would regularly reach precisely opposite
conclusions in a wide range of controversies").
68 Freethought Soc'y v. Chester County, 334 F3d 247, 251, 270 (3d Cir. 2003).
69 Id. at 251.
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or maintain the plaque.70 Then, in 2001 a lawyer for a group of atheists,
agnostics, and other "freethinkers" demanded that it be taken down.71 In
the suit, commenced to force the county to remove the plaque, the pri-
mary plaintiff acknowledged she had been aware of the plaque since 1960,
but she apparently did not find it offensive until she became an atheist in
1996 and was "not bothered enough by it to complain until 2001.",72 Re-
plying to the plaintiffs' claim that the plaque represented an affirmative
governmental endorsement of religion, the county argued that the plaque's
long history detracted from any conclusion that the county was endorsing• 73
religion. To decide the issue, the court investigated the initial purpose
behind the plaque's erection in 1920, the reasons why the county refused
to remove the plaque when so demanded in 2001, whether a reasonable
observer would know of the plaque's long history, and whether the age of
74
the plaque was visually apparent.
Not only does the endorsement test subjectively measure perception,
but it requires extensive judicial oversight of private religious speech con-
ducted on public property, even when the government is not officially
sponsoring or sanctioning that speech,7 lest the perception mistakenly occur
that the government is so sponsoring.
70 Id. at 250.
71 Id. at 250, 255.
72 Id. at 250, 254; see also Freethought Soc'y v. Chester County, 191 E Supp. zd 589, 592
(E.D. Pa. 2002), rev'd, Freethought Soc'y, 334 E3d 247.
73 Freethought Socy, 334 F3 d at 250.
74 Id. at 252, 262 (presuming a reasonable observer would be "aware of the age and
history of the plaque," and finding such observer "would believe the plaque itself historic").
This inquiry then devolved into one of whether a viewer would be aware of the entire context
in which the plaque was erected. Id. at 263. In applying the endorsement test, the courts
essentially have to conduct fact-finding missions. For instance, in Santa Fe, to determine
whether the purpose of the school district's policy permitting student-led prayer before high
school football games was to endorse religion, the Court believed it should "not stop at an
analysis of the text of the policy" but should also examine "the circumstances surrounding its
enactment." Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 315 (zooo). Such an examina-
tion would extend to whatever involvement the school district had in any previous types of
religion-related practices or activities in the schools. See id. at 295 (the complaint in Sante Fe
alleged several religious practices by the school district).
75 In Pinette, which involved a private group's placement of a cross in a public plaza
next to the state capitol, the Court ruled that the display did not violate the Establishment
Clause. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 770 (1995). However,
the plurality left open the possibility that the Establishment Clause might be violated if the
government "fostered or encouraged" the mistaken attribution of private religious speech
to the government. Id. at 766. Justice O'Connor noted that "an impermissible message of
endorsement can be sent in a variety of contexts, not all of which involve direct government
speech or outright favoritism." Id. at 774 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment). This may occur "even if the governmental actor neither intends nor actively
encourages [the endorsement]." Id. at 777. Thus, the Establishment Clause imposes on
the government "affirmative obligations that may require a State, in some situations, to take
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The Court's creation of a nationalized dissenter's right under the Es-
tablishment Clause allows relatively little freedom or flexibility to state
and local governments to accommodate the religious views and practices
of their residents. This judicial intrusion into the religious expressions of
society is evident in a controversy taking place in San Diego. For more
than fifty years, a large cross has stood in a city park atop Mount Soledad.
Indeed, there has been a cross at that location since 1913, and the present
cross is part of a Korean War veterans memorial. However, the park has
been embroiled in litigation since 1989, when a "self-described atheist and
humanist" sued to have the cross removed." Despite a decade and a half of
litigation, the city remains strongly supportive of the cross. In a July 2005
referendum, nearly seventy-five percent of the voters approved a measure
to preserve and maintain the cross at its present location.7"
As the Mount Soledad cross dispute shows, "the Court's generally ex-
pansive understanding of what it means to establish religion continue[s]
to breed litigation, and to hinder legislative and local experiments with
creative" accommodations of religion. This refusal to allow local flex-
ibility was evident in Larkin v. Grendel's Den, where the Court struck down
a law giving a church the right to veto the grant of a liquor license to any
establishment located within a five-hundred-foot radius of the church."s
Even though the particular community may have found that nearby bars
had a detrimental and discouraging effect on religious practice, the Court
applied a nationalized dissenter's right to force the community to abide by
mandates not at all responsive to the needs of that particular community.
Another area in which the Court's Establishment Clause doctrine pre-
vents local flexibility or diversity is the teaching of intelligent design as an
alternative to evolution. Intelligent design is described as "the idea that
living organisms are so complex that the best explanation [for their exis-
steps to avoid being perceived as supporting or endorsing a private religious message." Id.
Consequently, even though Justice O'Connor joined in the majority opinion which stated
that "private religious speech ... is as fully protected under the Free Speech Clause as secular
private expression," id. at 760 (majority opinion), she also announced that the Establishment
Clause limits the Free Speech Clause's protection of private religious speech when that
speech occurs on government property or in other contexts in which the speech becomes as-
sociated with the government. Id. at 772 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment). The problem, of course, is how to determine when private speech becomes
associated with the government.
76 Randal C. Arch ibold, High on a HillAbove San Diego, a Church-State Fight Plays Out, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 1, 2005, at A9.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Mary Ann Glendon, Law, Communities, and the Religious Freedom Language of the
Constitution, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 672, 679 (1992) (using the quoted language in reference to
"creative use of mediating structures to deliver social services," although it also applicable to
other efforts to accommodate religion).
8o Larkin v. Grendel's Den, 459 U.S. i 16, 117, 127 (1982).
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tence] is that some kind of higher intelligence designed them."'" Defend-
ers of intelligent design argue that students should have access to a variety
of scientific theories about the origins of human life.8' But even though
communities are in charge of education and the setting of school curricula,
current legal doctrine suggests that schools cannot teach intelligent design
because it amounts to a modern version of creationism and hence consti-
tutes state endorsement of religion.
83
The Court's use of a nationalized dissenter's right often makes it dif-
ficult for state and local governments to accommodate religion.84 In Texas
Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, for instance, the Court struck down a statute ex-85
empting religious periodicals from a state sales tax. The Court ruled that
it could find "[n]o concrete need to accommodate religious activity,"'86 even
though the state legislature had obviously come to exactly the opposite
conclusion.87 In the words of Justice Rehnquist, "governmental assistance
which does not have the effect of 'inducing' religious belief, but instead
merely 'accommodates' or implements an independent religious choice
does not ... violate the Establishment Clause .... ,88
By using the Establishment Clause to create a nationalized set of dis-
senter's rights, the Court has ignored the federalism aspect of the First
Amendment. According to Professor Conkle, the Establishment Clause
81 Laurie Goodstein, Evolution Lawsuit Opens With Broadside Against Intelligent Design,
N.Y. TiMisS, Sept. 27, 2005, at Az.
82 See Complaint at 2-3, Kitzmiller v. Dover, 400 E Supp. zd 707 (M.D. Pa. 2005) (No.
04-CV-2688), available at 2004 WL 3008270.
83 See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 581-82 (1987) (holding state law violated
the Establishment Clause where it forbade the teaching of evolution in public schools unless
"creation science" was also taught); McClean v. Ark. Bd. of Educ., 529 E Supp. 1255 (E.D. Ark.
1982) (striking down statute requiring public schools to "give balanced treatment to creation-
science and to evolution-science").
84 Accommodation is distinct from establishment:
The hallmark of accommodation is that the individual or group de-
cides for itself whether to engage in a religious practice, or what prac-
tice to engage in, on grounds independent of the governmental action.
The government simply facilitates ("accommodates") the decision of
the individual or group; it does not induce or direct, by means of either
incentives or compulsion.
Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An Update and a Response to the Critics, 6o
GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 685, 688 (1992). As Professor McConnell writes, "the government has
some latitude to accommodate religion beyond the requirements of the Free Exercise Clause,
but there has been no discussion of where the line may be drawn." Id. at 709.
85 Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 25 (1989).
86 Id. at 18.
87 Maybe, for instance, a state would want to accommodate religious organizations in
their attempt to convey certain values, which in turn could have a beneficial effect on the
ethical state of society.
88 Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 727 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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was intended by the Framers to effect "a policy of federalism on questions
of church and state." 89 As originally conceived, the Establishment Clause
would prohibit the federal government from interfering with the states'S. 90
freedom to legislate on matters of religion. The issue of federalism was
central to the debate surrounding the drafting of the First Amendment. 9
Not only did the drafters not intend to apply the Establishment Clause to
states and localities, but the historical evidence "strongly suggests that the
fourteenth amendment, as originally understood, did not incorporate the
• 92
establishment clause for application to state government action."
In the first 150 years of the Constitution's existence, very few religion
clause cases were decided. 93 This was because it was generally agreed that
the Framers did not intend to apply the clause to the states. However, in
the past half-century, ever since the Court incorporated the religion clauses
into the Fourteenth Amendment, there has been a flood of First Amend-
ment litigation. Furthermore, with the incorporation of the Establish-
ment Clause in Everson v. Board of Education,96 the Supreme Court shifted
its First Amendment jurisprudence in an increasin~gly nationalized direc-
tion, leaving little room for the states to 
improvise.
The First Amendment's federalism component has recently been resur-
rected by Justice Thomas. As he explained in his concurring opinion in Elk
89 Conkle, supra note 43, at 1134.
90 See id. at 1134-35.
91 See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights andthe Fourteenth Amendment, 10 1 YALE L.J. 1'93,
1273 (1992).
92 Conkle, supra note 43, at 1' 36.
[Tihere is ... specific evidence that the framers and ratifiers of the
fourteenth amendment, whatever their intentions with respect to the
Bill of Rights generally, at least did not intend to incorporate the es-
tablishment clause for application to the states. In 1875 and 1876, after
the adoption of the fourteenth amendment, Congress considered, but
rejected, a resolution that was specifically designed to make the religion
clauses of the first amendment applicable to the states.
Id. at 1137.
93 See James J. Knicely, "First Principles" and the Misplacement of the "Wall of Separation":
Too Late in the Day for a Cure?, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 17', 173 (2004).
94 See Stuart D. Poppel, Federalism, Fundamental Fairness, and the Religion Clauses, 25
CUMB. L. REV. 247, 250 (1995).
95 See John C. Jeffries, Jr. & James E. Ryan, A Political History of the Establishment Clause,
100 MICH. L. REV. 279, 287 (2001).
96 Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. i, 15 (1947).
97 Thus, the states have to conform their religious liberty decisions to the mandates of the
Supreme Court. But cf. Joseph P. Viteritti, Choosing Equality: Religious Freedom and Educational
Opportunity Under Constitutional Federalism, 15 YALE L. & Po.'v REv. I 13, 149 (1996) (describing
how "[s]ome state courts have imposed aid restrictions that are much more limiting towards
religious schools" than the restrictions imposed by the federal Constitution as the Supreme
Court has interpreted it).
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Grove Unified School District v. Newdow, "the Establishment Clause is a fed-
eralism provision which ... resists incorporation."98 Justice Thomas further
observed that the "text and history of the Establishment Clause strongly
suggest that it is a federalism provision intended to prevent Congress from
interfering with state establishments." In this same vein, Justice Stewart
had earlier recognized that "the Establishment Clause was primarily an
attempt to insure that Congress not only would be powerless to establish
a national church, but would also be unable to interfere with existing state
establishments."l100
Scholars have also emphasized the federalist nature of the Establish-
ment Clause. Professor Gerard Bradley recognized the intent of the Es-
tablishment Clause to "preserve existing state constitutional regimes from
intermeddling federal legislation." 101 According to Steven Smith, "[tihe
religion clauses were understood as a federalist measure, not as the enact-
ment of any substantive principle of religious freedom."10 ' Akhil Amar de-
scribes the Establishment Clause as being "utterly agnostic on the substan-
tive issue of establishment; it simply mandated that the issue be decided
state-by-state and that Congress keep its hands off. .. , 103 Some critics
even argue that the incorporation of the Establishment Clause through the
Fourteenth Amendment, and hence its applicability to the states, should
be rolled back. 1°4 Such a strategy "would certainly give the states far more
latitude to acknowledge, accommodate, and promote religion than current
doctrine allows."'  Indeed, this is just what the Framers advocated. James
Madison argued that "[tihere is not a shadow of right in the general govern-
ment to intermeddle with religion."' 6 And James Iredell, later to become a
justice of the Supreme Court, explained that the proposed Establishment
98 Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. I, 45 (2004) (Thomas, J., concur-
ring).
99 Id. at 49.
oo Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 309 (1963) (Stewart, J., dis-
senting).
iO GERARD V. BRADLEY, CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS IN AMERICA 92 (1987).
102 STEVEN D. SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE: THE QUEST FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL
PRINCIPLE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 30 (1995).
103 AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 22, at 246.
io4 See William K. Lietzau, Rediscovering the Establishment Clause: Federalism and the
Rollback of Incorporation, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 1191, 1193 (1990).
105 Note, Rethinking the Incorporation of the Establishment Clause: A Federalist View, io5
HARv. L. REV. 1700, 1715 (1992) [hereinafter Note, Rethinking Incorporation]. Many federalism
critics of incorporation argue that the Framers intended states to have leeway in their own
church-state relations, and that states should be free to shape those relations so as to allow for
greater experimentation in education and public benefits programs. See Lietzau, supra note
104, at 1225-27 & n.202; Note, Rethinking Incorporation, supra, at 1700.
106 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 330 (Jonathan Elliot ed., Philadelphia, J.B. Lippin & Co., 2d ed. 1836).
[Vol. 95
2006-2007] JUDICIAL CENTRALIZATION OF RIGHTS
Clause left the matter of religion "to the operation of [each state's] own
principles."'O0
The modern Establishment Clause doctrine, however, was formed dur-
ing the Warren and Burger eras, when the Court assumed sole and exclusive
authority to dictate all matters concerning individual rights. In connection
with its equal protection jurisprudence, focused as it was on the goal of
preventing social exclusion, the Court derived a dissenter's-rights view of
the Establishment Clause. This right reflected a fear that the failure to
keep the religious and political spheres separate would lead to social strife
along religious lines and a fragmentation of the political community.108
Justices Stevens and Breyer have argued that public aid to religion would
foster political discord and tear the social fabric underlying American de-
mocracy. 10 9 Drawing on experiences from the Balkans, Northern Ireland,
and the Middle East, Justice Stevens wrote: "Whenever we remove a brick
from the wall that was designed to separate religion and government, we
increase the risk of religious strife and weaken the foundation of our de-
mocracy." "o
There have been recent times when the Court, to decentralize this area
of liberty, appeared as if it might be about to return religion to the states.
In Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, the Supreme Court upheld the constitution-
ality of an Ohio school voucher program, in which ninety-six percent of the
vouchers were used by students enrolling in religious schools. Prompt-
ing the voucher program was a recognition of the "crisis of magnitude"
that existed in the Cleveland public school system, with only ten percent
of ninth graders able to pass a proficiency test and more than two-thirds
of high school students failing to graduate. 11 The program passed with
the strong support of inner-city minorities, who saw it as a way of escaping
the chronically failing urban schools." 3 Indeed, studies have revealed that
107 4 id. at 198.
io8 See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 718 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Another concern includes not making "a person's standing in the political community" turn
on her religion. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668,687-88 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring). As one commentator has noted, "it is plausible to conclude that today's Establishment
Clause doctrine communicates at least one thing very clearly: that the intermingling of politi-
cal and religious authority is categorically bad." Mark D. Rosen, Establishment, Expressivism,
and Federalism, 78 CHi.-KENT L. REv. 669,685 (2003).
1O9 Zelman, 536 U.S. at 717 (Breyer, J., dissenting); id. at 686 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
1 Io Id. at 686 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
iI I Id. at 644-47 (majority opinion).
i1 Id. at 644.
113 See Joseph P. Viteritti, Reading Zelman: The Triumph of Pluralism, and its Effects on
Liberty, Equality, and Choice, 7 6 S. CAL. L. REV. 1105, 1173-74 (2003) (discussing the argument
that almost a half-century after Brown v. Board of Education was handed down, most African
American children are still not getting a decent education, so vouchers are the necessary next
step beyond Brown).
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most urban public school students around the nation are failing to perform
at even the most basic level of achievement and that African American
parents strongly support school choice, "with 60 percent saying they would
switch their children from public to private school if money were not an
obstacle." 4 An investigation commissioned by the National Center for
Education Statistics shows that private schools tend to produce superior
cognitive outcomes, provide a safer and more structured learning environ-
ment, and have less racial segregation." 5 It was also found that "minority
students who attend Catholic schools do better than their public school
peers" and that "disadvantaged minority students who attend Catholic
high schools are more likely to graduate, go on to college, and earn a de-gree.,,116
In Zelman, Justice Thomas cited data from Cleveland showing that reli-
gious schools are more educationally effective than public schools. Whereas
ninety-five percent of the eighth graders in Catholic schools passed a state
reading test, only fifty-seven percent of their public school peers did; simi-
larly, whereas seventy-five percent of the Catholic school students passed a
math proficiency test, their public school peers had only a twenty-two per-117
cent passage rate. Furthermore, "the average [government] cost of send-
ing a child to a religious school is considerably lower than the cost of pub-
lic school." I" The facts behind the Ze/man case provide a clear example:
"[R]eligious schools received a maximum of $2250 per student inI public
funding, whereas public schools were allocated $7746 per student."
In Employment Division v. Smith, the Court also indicated a propensity
to return religion to the states. "0 Prior to Smith, the rule was that state-im-
posed burdens on religious exercise presumptively violated the Free Exer-
cise Clause and that government could sustain those burdens only by dem-
onstrating a compelling government interest.12 1 Smith replaced this rule
with one stating that no compelling interest is required to enforce neutral
state laws of general applicability that burden religious exercise. ' Thus,
Smith largely left regulation of religious practices to the states, as long as
they regulated such practices with neutral, generally applicable laws.
1 14 JOSEPH P. VITERITTI, CHOOSING EQUALITY: SCHOOL CHOICE, THE CONSTITUTION, AND
CIVIL SOCIETY 7 (1999).
II5 Id. at 8o.
1 16 Id. at 83. Other studies have also found "Catholic schools to be an effective vehicle
for educating the same minority populations that have not been well served by urban public
schools." Id. at 84.
117 Zelman, 536 U.S. at 68I (Thomas, J., concurring).
i18 Viteritti, supra note 113, at i 163.
119 Id. at I164.
12o Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
121 See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
122 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 88I, 883.
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Smith was followed by City of Boerne v. Flores, in which the Court over-
ruled a congressional attempt to restore the pre-Smith rule through the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993. The Act required strict
scrutiny to be the test used in determining whether a governmental regu-
lation violated the Free Exercise Clause. However, the Court struck down
this test, arguing that when Congress acts under section five of the Four-
teenth Amendment, it cannot expand the scope of rights or create new
rights.114 Congress can only act to remedy rights recognized by the courts
or adopt laws to prevent the violation of rights recognized by the courts."
Because the Court saw the Religious Freedom Restoration Act as creating
new rihts, it declared the Act an unconstitutional exercise of congressional
power.
Although the Boerne Court seemed to uphold federalism principles by
noting that the Act exceeded Congress's enumerated power under section
five and significantly intruded "into the States' traditional prerogatives and
123 Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2ooobb-bb-4 (zooo) [hereinafter
RFRA]; City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). In the Boerne case, a generally appli-
cable zoning ordinance that required permission to make structural changes in a designated
historical area was enforced by the Boerne City Council against a Catholic church that needed
to expand in order to accommodate its growing congregation. Id. at 511-13. After permission
to modify the church building was denied, the church filed suit, claiming that the city could
not demonstrate a compelling justification, as required by RFRA, for enforcing its zoning
ordinances against the church. Id. at 512. Prior to Smith, however, the First Amendment itself
would have required the demonstration of such a compelling government interest before a
zoning ordinance could restrict a church's efforts to accommodate the worship needs of its
parishioners. But under Smith, the First Amendment provided no protection to the church, ef-
fectively giving the city council the absolute power to deny the church an exemption from the
ordinance, without even giving any reason therefore. See id. at 513-14. In Boerne, the Court
struck down RFRA as an unconstitutional exercise of congressional power. Id. at 536.
124 City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 527-29. According to the Court, Congress's power under
section five of the Fourteenth Amendment gives it the authority only to remedy violations
of constitutional rights, not the authority to expand substantive constitutional rights. Id. at
520-29. Because the Court held in Smith that neutral laws of general applicability inciden-
tally burdening religious practices do not require a compelling justification in order to comply
with the First Amendment, RFRA's requirement of a compelling governmental justification
for such laws improperly expands religious rights beyond the degree of religious freedom
afforded by Smith. Id. at 529-35. Thus, RFRA exceeded the scope of Congress's authority
under section five of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 536.
The newly restrictive test for laws under section five of the Fourteenth Amendment,
as announced in City of Boerne, was later applied in three subsequent cases-Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999), Kimel v.
Florida Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2ooo), and Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v.
Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001 )-tO invalidate congressional enactments. However, more recent-
ly, the Court has somewhat reversed course by upholding federal laws in Nevada Department of
Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003) and Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004).
125 City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 5 18-25.
126 Id. at 532, 536.
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general authority to regulate for the health and welfare of their citizens," '' 27
its decision may actually have been influenced more by a desire to repel
what it saw as a direct challenge to its authority to interpret the scope of a
constitutional right. Thus, the Court appeared to be "looking at the case
through the lens of judicial supremacy and felt compelled to put down
what it saw as a congressional rebellion." 28
B. A Centralized Free Speech Doctrine in a Time of Divergent, Pervasive Media
Only with respect to obscenity has the Court held that First Amendment
rights should not be defined by uniform, centralized standards.2 9 The
Miller doctrine looks to local community standards to determine what is so
offensive as to constitute obscenity.3 Thus, in theory, the moral views of
the pertinent community define what is obscene. This injects an element
of federalism into obscenity law because different communities can have
different moral views. Relying on principles of federalism, the Court has
stated that "our Nation is simply too big and too diverse for this Court to
reasonably expect that such standards [of offensiveness] could be articu-
lated for all 50 States in a single formulation."'' Miller recognized that
"[p]eople in different States vary in their tastes and attitudes, and this di-
versity is not to be strangled by the absolutism of imposed uniformity." "
As the Court stated, "[i]t is neither realistic nor constitutionally sound to
read the First Amendment as requiring that the people of Maine or Mis-
sissippi accept public depiction of conduct found tolerable in Las Vegas, or
New York City."'
127 Id. at 534.
1z8 Stephen Gardbaum, The Federalism Implications of Flores, 39 Wm. & MARv L. REV.
665,669 (1998). The Court held that the Act exceeded Congress's section five power because
it attempted a "substantive change in constitutional protections." City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at
532. The Court distinguished legislation that enforces rights from legislation that defines or
creates constitutional rights. Id. at 519. But, of course, "the line between measures that rem-
edy or prevent unconstitutional actions and measures that make a substantive change in the
governing law is not easy to discern." Id.
129 On the other hand, the Court has rejected centralization in other areas. For instance,
in Grutter, the advocates of colorblindness argued for a national constitutional ban on racial
preferences. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 367-78 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
130 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
I31 ld. at 3o.
132 Id. at 33. This rejection of national standards was reasserted in Hamling v. United
States, where the Court held that the community standards test for federal obscenity prosecu-
tions was local, not national, and not necessarily statewide-the relevant geographic com-
munity could be even smaller than that of an entire state. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S.
87, 105 (1974).
133 Miller, 413 U.S. at 32. As one commentator has argued, if the Court's objective in
Miller "was to craft a test that would allow rational men and women to play a role in policing
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But theory has not translated into practice, particularly in connection
with these federalism-type concerns. First, because of the Internet and its
nationalizing effect, Miller is losing its effectiveness in allowing communi-
ties to regulate according to their standards of decency.'34 Second, the com-
munity-standards focus of Miller applies only to hard-core obscenity, not to
the vast amount of pornography that currently exists.
The Miller community-standards test has become "difficult to apply in
recent years with the explosion of the Internet as the dominant and most
1135efficient means for disseminating pornographic material." Because of
the Internet, "communities now transcend geographic boundaries." 136 On
the Internet, "the increasing globalization of information flows ... make
the use of local community policing standards obsolete." 137 For instance,
in ACLU v. Reno, the Third Circuit asserted that the Child Online Protec-
tion Act would require Internet site operators to screen their content ac-
cording to the geographic criteria of each of its users, which would then
create a duty on the operators to comply with all the different community
standards concerning minors throughout the United States. "' Later, on
appeal in Ashcroft v. ACLU, Justice O'Connor rejected the use of commu-
nity standards for the Internet. She argued that a national standard was
"necessary in my view for any reasonable regulation of Internet obscen-
their community's morality, Miller fits the bill, for it succeeds in giving fact finders the op-
portunity to express their moral indignation and outrage." Cara L. Newman, Comment, Eyes
Wide Open, Minds Wide Shut:Art, Obscenity, and the First Amendment in Contemporary America, 53
DEPAUL L. REV. 121, 145 (2003).
134 Despite the Court's opinion in ltiller, 413 U.S. at 30-34, which expanded the reach
of governmental regulation of obscenity to include materials offensive to the moral standards
of the local rather than the national community, pornography "grew like weeds in a vacant
lot." William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on Constitutional
Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2o62, 2346 (2002). Eventually, obscenity cases
stopped reaching the Court, partly because government agencies abandoned any censorship
efforts, and partly because "local censorship efforts were easily evaded by national channels
of communication such as mail service, telephone, and the internet." Id. Moreover, given
the mobility of persons and families, as well as the relative isolation of people within defined
geographic boundaries, the concept of "community standard" is difficult to apply.
135 John Tehranian, Sanitizing Cyberspace: Obscenity, Miller, and the Future of Public
Discourse on the Internet, 11 J. INTELL. PROP. L. I, 18 (2003); seealso id. at 2 (stating that an effec-
tive standard for obscenity has "proven quite elusive").
136 Patrick M. Garry, The First Amendment in a Time of Media Proliferation: Does Freedom of
Speech Entaila Private Right to Censor?, 65 U. PrIr. L. REV. 183, 216 (2004).
137 Tehranian, supra note 135, at 17-18.
138 ACLU v. Reno, 217 F3d 162, 166 (3d Cir. 2000) ("COPA essentially requires that
every Web publisher subject to the statute abide by the most restrictive and conservative
state's community standards in order to avoid criminal liability."), vacated, Ashcroft v. ACLU
(Ashcroft 1), 535 U.S. 564 (2002).
139 Ashcroft 1, 535 U.S. at 587 (O'Connor, J., concurring). This rejection coincided with
Judge Leonard Garth's ruling in the case below, in which he disavowed the use of contempo-
rary community standards entirely for the Internet. Reno, 217 E3d at 166.
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ity.' ' 40 Justice Breyer agreed, stating the relevant standard for the Internet
"is national." 4 1 However, as Justice Thomas argued for the majority, "[i]f
a publisher wishes for its material to be judged only by the standards of
particular communities, then it need only take the simple step of utilizing
a medium that enables it to target the release of its material into those com-
munities."142
The Court's centralized approach to individual rights can also be seen
in its treatment of legislative attempts to regulate Internet indecency. No
matter how pornographic the material, as long as it falls just short of ob-
scenity, the Court-using the single nationalized standard of whether the
regulations restrict adult access-has struck down attempts to regulate por-
nography for the sake of child protection.1 43
According to a 1999 article, "[a]lmost 70% of the current traffic on the
Internet is 'adult-oriented material, '  and there are "approximately 200
new pornographic sites created each day." 14' This is a particularly worri-
some problem, since "[n]inety percent of children between the ages of five
and seventeen ... now use computers."' 46
In addressing the problem of pornography on the Internet, Congress
has tried on several occasions to construct doorways that will seal off sexu-
ally explicit material from children. In 1996, it passed the Communica-
tions Decency Act, which prohibited the transmission over the Internet ofS 147
indecent material to anyone under the age of eighteen. This prohibition,
. ..148
however, was ruled unconstitutional in Reno v. ACLU. Next, Congress
passed the Child Online Protection Act ("COPA"), 149 which tried to ad-
dress the concerns articulated in Reno by forcing commercial vendors of
14o Ashcroftl, 535 U.S. at 587.
141 Id. at 590 (Breyer, J., concurring).
142 Id. at 583 (majority opinion).
143 See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 874-75 (1997) (stating the interest in protecting chil-
dren "does not justify an unnecessarily broad suppression of speech addressed to adults").
144 Elizabeth M. Shea, The Children's Internet Protection Act of 1999: Is Internet Filtering
Software the Answer? 24 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 167, 174 (1999); see also H.R. REP. No. 105-775,
at 1o (1998).
145 Shea, supra note 144.
146 Mitchell P. Goldstein, Congress and the Courts Battle Over the First Amendment: Can the
Law Really Protect Children from Pornography on the Internet? 21 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER &
INFO. L. 141, 143 (2003). Studies have shown that most adult-oriented commercial websites
do not use age verification measures, and that about a quarter of them employ practices like
"mouse trapping" that aim to keep users from exiting the site. Id. at 144. Moreover, approxi-
mately three quarters of them displayed "adult content on the first page, which was accessible
to everyone." Id. at 145.
147 See 47 U.S.C. § 223(a), (d) (1996).
148 Reno, 521 U.S. 844 (holding that the Act's provisions were unconstitutionally vague
and burdensome to the First Amendment rights of adults).
149 47 U.S.C. § 231 (zooo).
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pornographic Internet material to require a credit card for access to their
sites. This statute forbade any person from using the World Wide Web to
make "any communication for commercial purposes that is available to any
minor and that includes any material that is harmful to minors."''" Litiga-
tion regarding COPA's constitutionality is ongoing; although, the Court has
indicated the law is likely to be struck down."5 " Similarly, with the Child
Pornography and Prevention Act, Congress tried to expand the federal
prohibition on child pornography to include computer-generated images
of minors engaging in sexually explicit conduct ("virtual child pornogra-
phy"). 1, 3 This law was overturned in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition. 1
4
Aside from the effects of the Internet, developments in privacy law may
also be eroding the enforcement of community standards in obscenity law.
In Lawrence v. Texas, the Court dealt a severe blow to legal expressions of
community morality."' Lawrence essentially created a centralized standard
of sexual privacy that trumps any countervailing community moral stan-
dards. If, as Lawrence stated, decisions concerning sexual activity are at
the core of individual autonomy protected by the Due Process Clause,'56
then communications about sexual activities may also receive similar con-
stitutional protections, regardless of how offensive or obscene those com-
munications are to community standards. If the Court's ruling that the
Constitution "gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how
to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex" ' is extended
to sexual communications, then obscenity regulation could only be sup-
ported if injuries other than moral harms are involved. Justice Scalia in fact
15o See 47 U.S.C. § 231(c)(i)(A). The Act imposed criminal penalties for the knowing
posting, for "commercial purposes," of Internet content that is "harmful to minors," but pro-
vided an affirmative defense to commercial vendors who restricted access to prohibited ma-
terials by "requiring use of a credit card" or "any other reasonable measures that are feasible
under available technology." Id. § 231(a)(i), (c)(1); see also Communications Decency Act of
1996, 47 U.S.C. § 223 (an earlier attempt by Congress to criminalize certain speech on the
Internet); Ashcroft v. ACLU (Ashcroft l), 542 U.S. 656, 661-63 (2004) (describing COPA).
151 47 U.S.C. § 231(a)(I).
152 Ashcroft 11, 542 U.S. at 673 (affirming grant of a preliminary injunction against en-
forcement of COPA). Leading up to the Ashcroft H decision, the district court found that
COPA is "likely to burden some speech that is protected for adults." Id. at 665 (citing ACLU
v. Reno, 31 E Supp. 2d 473 (i999), aff'd, 217 E3d 162 (3d Cir. 2ooo)).
153 Child Pornography and Prevention Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(A)-(C) (2000).
154 Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234 (2002) (holding provisions banning vir-
tual child pornography to be overbroad and unconstitutional).
155 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003).
156 Seeid. at 574.
157 Id. at 572. Justice Kennedy further wrote: "[Tlhe fact that the governing majority in
a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for
upholding a law prohibiting the practice ..... Id. at 577 (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478
U.S. 186, z 16 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
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observed that Lawrence "effectively decrees the end of all morals legisla-
tion.""'
A steadfast refusal to allow for any decentralization regarding the indi-
vidual rights doctrines governing indecency and pornography has exacer-
bated the Court's listless attempt to localize obscenity law. This refusal
stifles any flexible or innovative response a democratic community might
create to the unique problems it encounters with respect to the effect of
such speech on their community and children.
In Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. FCC,
the Court addressed the constitutionality of regulations in the Cable Act of
1992, which required cable operators to place indecent programs on a sepa-
rate channel, to block that channel, and to unblock it within thirty days of
a subscriber's written request for access to the channel.' 6° In holding these
regulations unconstitutional, the Supreme Court focused primarily on the
inconveniences to would-be viewers of indecent programming, including
the viewer who might want a single show, as opposed to the entire chan-
nel; the viewer who might want to choose a channel without any advance
planning (the "surfer"); or the one who worries about the danger to his
reputation that might result if he makes a written request to subscribe to161
the channel. However, none of these burdens presented insurmountable
obstacles. Each one of these types of viewers could get access to the de-
sired programming by simply following the established procedures. Fur-
thermore, even though the Court recognized that the purpose of the regu-
lations was to protect minors, that it was a compelling purpose, 161 and that
158 Id. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting). As Justice Scalia argued, "[s]tate laws against biga-
my, same-sex marriage, adult incest, prostitution . . . bestiality, and obscenity are ... called into
question by today's decision." Id. at 590.
159 One example of a national standard is the FCC's national standard for broadcast
indecency, as revealed in FCCv. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 737-38 (1978). In a case
involving "The Howard Stern Show," the FCC ruled that community standards for broadcast
were to be judged by a national standard. In re Infinity Broad. Corp. of Pa., 2 F.C.C.R. 2705,
2706 (1987). Current law does not take into account society's desire to regulate certain moral
harms, which can be quite different from other harms such as violence against women. For
instance, some pornography could be considered morally bad because it encourages sexual
promiscuity or narcissistic personality characteristics or because it causes the reader to re-
gard other people as mere objects of sexual interest, whose feelings do not matter. See, e.g.,
Andrew Koppelman, Does Obscenity Cause Moral Harm?, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1635, 1666-67,
1672 (2005) (stating that "moral harm exists"). Moreover, for many parents, a desire to shape
their children's character through the avoidance of pornography is itself "an important aspect
of human liberty that deserves respect." Id. at 1673.
16o Denver Area Educ.Telecomms. Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 753 (1996). In ad-
dition to these restrictions, the regulations also required the programmers of leased channels
to alert cable operators of their intent to broadcast indecent material at least thirty days before
the scheduled broadcast date. Id. at 754.
161 Id. at 754, 760.
162 Id. at 755.
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the regulations only applied to sexual material (and not the kind of vitally
important political information present, for instance, in the Pentagon Papers
case ), the Court still struck them down, focusing on the provisions' bur-
densome impact on the programming available to adults. 6 4
With respect to indecent speech, the courts have created special consti-S 165
tutional rules for children. Because of the importance of the child-rear-
ing process, the constitutional demands of free speech must be "applied
with sensitivity ... to the special needs of parents and children."1  The
Supreme Court has specifically ruled that the government has an interest
in facilitating parental control over what their children see and hear.167 As
the Supreme Court stated, a democratic government requires "the healthy,
well-rounded growth of young people into full maturity as citizens, with• )168
all that implies." Consequently, where children are involved, freedoms
of speech may have to be "balanced against society's countervailing in-
terest in teaching ... the boundaries of socially appropriate behavior."' 69
This balancing requires flexibility at the local level, but the Court's strictly
nationalized First Amendment doctrine prevents such flexibility."7 More-
over, the doctrine basically casts aside all social interests in child protec-
tion whenever those interests come in conflict with the access rights of
adults. 171
163 N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam).
164 Denver Area, 518 U.S. at 759.
165 See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 757, 774 (1982) (describing numerous protec-
tions for children which have been upheld by the Court and upholding statute that prohibited
distribution of child pornography); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629,637 (1968) (upholding
statute that restricted the distribution of printed obscene material to children).
166 Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622,634 (1979) (discussing reasons why "the constitutional
rights of children cannot be equated with those of adults").
167 FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 749-50 (1978).
168 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168 (1944).
169 Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986).
170 Such flexibility is sorely lacking, as illustrated by the continual yet unsuccessful ef-
forts of states and localities to regulate the distribution of violent and sexually explicit video
games to children. See, e.g., Interactive Digital Software Ass'n v. St. Louis County, 329 E 3 d 954
(8th Cir. 2003) (holding ordinance prohibiting certain video games unconstitutional because
video games are a protected form of speech under the First Amendment). Despite federal
court after federal court striking down such attempted regulations, state after state and local-
ity after locality keep trying to regulate because of their beliefs in the harms caused by such
games. See Patrick M. Garry, Defining Speech in an Entertainment Age: The Case of FirstAmendment
Protection for Video Games, 57 SMU L. REv. 139 (2004); John M. Broder, Bill is Signed to Restrict
Video Games in California, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2005, at AI I (describing legislation prohibiting
"the sale to teenagers of electronic games featuring reckless mayhem and explicit sexual-
ity").
171 As Professor Shiffrin notes, "[c]hildren are the Achilles heel of liberal ideology."
Steven Shiffrin, Government Speech, 27 UCLA L. REV. 565,647 (198o). They are "more impres-
sionable and they constitute a captive audience"; therefore, it is understandable that the most
difficult speech problems occur with children. Id. But, the Court has stated that "protect-
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
C. Enforcing a Nationalized View of Individual Autonomy
Privacy has been a particularly prominent area in which the Court has used
centralized mandates concerning individual rights to dictate policy choices
and social values uniformly to every community in the nation. In its pri-
vacy decisions, the Court has not only used a right not mentioned in the
Constitution to strike down a host of state regulations, but in doing so, it
has defined what constitute the vital ingredients of personal dignity and
autonomy for all Americans. Moreover, as the privacy cases show, the nine-
person, unelected Supreme Court has decided that constitutional privacy is
to be defined almost exclusively in terms of sexual activity freedoms."'
According to the Court, privacy involves those "choices central to per-
sonal dignity and autonomy" that help "define one's own concept of exis-
tence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life."'
17 3
Furthermore, the types of choices described by the Court as vital to hu-
man development include "the choice to engage in sexual conduct and
the choice to have an abortion."' 74 The Court has not extended its privacy
jurisprudence to the problem of identity or informational privacy, despite
the fact that such privacy is increasingly under attack from new technolo-
gies. Indeed, individual claims against media or technological invasion of
privacy have not found a receptive ear in the Court. In fact, through its
First Amendment rulings, the Court has protected those actors and condi-
tions that contribute to this erosion of personal privacy.
The Court's privacy rulings presume that judges have the ability and
the duty to determine those personal choices that define human life and
sustain personal dignity. Privacy law also presumes that the courts can ad-
equately draw the fine lines between individual privacy, democratic values,
and social policies. Finally, the constitutional doctrines on privacy presume
that one centralized judiciary can better determine the parameters of in-
dividual autonomy than can any democratically elected state legislature or
county commission.
In Lawrence v. Texas, the Court held that a state statute criminalizing
same-sex sodomy violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
ing children ... does not justify an unnecessarily broad suppression of speech addressed to
adults." Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 564 (2001) (quoting Reno v. ACLU, 521
U.S. 844, 875 (1997)). The Court has even granted constitutional protection to the distribution
of virtual child pornography. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 258 (2002) (holding
provisions banning virtual child pornography to be overbroad and unconstitutional).
172 See infra notes 173-96 and accompanying text.
173 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (indicating that a
constitutional right of sexual privacy can trump all other community values or morals).
174 Patrick M. Garry, A Different Model for the Right to Privacy: The Political Question
Doctrine as a Substitute for Substantive Due Process, 61 U. MAMI L. REV. 169, 188 (zoo6) [herein-
after Garry, A Different Model]; see e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Casey, 505 U.S.
833; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. I 13 (1973).
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Clause.' Lawrence built upon the foundation initially laid in Griswoldv.
Connecticut, which announced a right of privacy belonging to married cou-
ples wishing to use contraceptives.7 6 This right of privacy was then ex-
tended in Eisenstadtv. Baird to unmarried couples.' Then, in Roev. Wade
and Carey v. Population Services International, the Court applied the right of
privacy to a woman's decision to abort her unborn fetus and to a minor's178
freedom to use contraceptives. Later, in upholding Roe, the Court in
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey equated the abor-
tion decision with the right to define one's own existence.
There is a significant debate among constitutional scholars as to whether
Lawrence involved a right of privacy or a liberty interest, both of which are
based on the Due Process Clause. Yet despite the grounds on which it
175 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578-79, overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
176 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,485 (1965).
177 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (ruling that a law banning the distribu-
tion of contraceptives to unmarried persons violated their right of privacy).
178 Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 68 1-82 (1997) (overturning a state stat-
ue forbidding the distribution of contraceptives to persons under sixteen years of age); Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973) (holding that women have a constitutional right to choose an
abortion). In Carey, the Court ruled that "the right to privacy in connection with decisions af-
fecting procreation extends to minors as well as to adults." Id. at 693. Prior to Carey, the Court
had already overturned statutory restrictions on a minor's right to obtain an abortion. Planned
Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976). In Stenbergv. Carhart, the Court
struck down a Nebraska law outlawing partial birth abortion as violating the "undue burden"
test. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 945-46 (2000).
179 Casey, 505 U.S. at 851.
18o As the Court framed it, the question was "[wihether petitioners' criminal convictions
for adult consensual sexual intimacy in the home violates their vital interests in liberty and
privacy protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Lawrence, 539
U.S. at 564. In his dissent, Justice Scalia notes that the majority did not describe the right to
sexual intimacy as a fundamental right, but only describes petitioners' conduct as "an exercise
of their liberty." Id. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Professor Hermann categorizes Lawrence as
a privacy case: "[niow that Lawrence has overruled Bowers, the question is no longer whether
there is a right to sexual privacy, but rather, what specific aspects of sexual privacy cannot
be burdened by state regulation." Donald H.J. Hermann, Pulling the Fig Leaf off the Right
of Privaty: Sex and the Constitution, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 909, 956 (2005). Professor Carpenter
likewise sees Lawrence as a privacy case. Dale Carpenter, s Lawrence Libertarian?, 88 MINN.
L. REv. 1140, 1 16o (2004). Professor Tribe, however, argues that Lawrence is best viewed as an
equality decision. Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The "FundamentalRight" that Dare
Not Speak Its Name, 117 HAiiv. L. REV. 1893, 1898 (2004). Professor Barnett also sees the case
as one involving liberty. Randy E. Barnett, Justice Kennedy's Libertarian Revolution: Lawrence
v. Texas, 2003 CATO Sup. CT. REV. 21, 33 (2003). However, as Barnett argues, seeing Lawrence
as a liberty case calls its reasoning into question. See Randy E. Barnett, Grading Justice Kennedy:
A Reply to Professor Carpenter, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1582 (2005). Since the Court does not identify
the liberty involved as a fundamental right (because the Court does not find that the liberty
is deeply rooted in the nation's history), it should receive the lowest level of scrutiny-the
rational basis test, which "almost always" finds a "conceivable rational basis" in the statute
under question. Id. at 1583.
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relied, the Court decided to protect the right of intimate sexual relations.'8 1
Furthermore, even though the Lawrence Court did not specifically declare
homosexual sodomy a fundamental right, it seemed to apply the same kind
of scrutiny that is usually given to fundamental rights.18
Previously, in Bowers, Justice White's opinion examined whether Amer-
ican history and tradition had in effect created a fundamental right "to en-
gage in sodomy," and concluded there was no constitutional basis for such
a right. ' When the Court reversed itself in Lawrence, "Justice Kennedy
conducted the same kind of historical examination that swayed the Court's
decision in Bowers, but this time found no national history or tradition of
condemning homosexual sodomy.'s 4 Justice Kennedy argued that history
and traditions "show an emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial
protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in
matters pertaining to sex."lS. Meanwhile, Justice Scalia, in dissent, wrote
that "an 'emerging awareness' does not establish a 'fundamental right."' 16
Perhaps the most far-reaching consequence of Lawrence involves its fu-
ture effect on morals laws of any kind. Justice Scalia argued that Lawrence
has put into jeopardy all morals laws-e.g., those against bigamy, same-sex
marriage, adult incest, and obscenity. 18 Constitutional scholar Steven Ca-
181 The Lawrence Court concluded that the "liberty protected by the Constitution allows
homosexual persons the right to [form intimate bonds in their private lives]." Lawrence, 539
U.S. at 567.
182 Justice Scalia characterized the decision as a result of the Court signing on to an
activist agenda that seeks to declare homosexuality a fundamental right, even though "the
Court does not have the boldness" to say so. Id. at 594, 602 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
183 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. i86, 19o-92 (1986), overruled by Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558.
The Court also rejected the finding of a more general right to sexual intimacy from which a
right to engage in homosexual sodomy could be derived. See id. at 190-91.
184 Garry, A Different Model, supra note 174, at 193 (citing Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567-74
(majority opinion)).
185 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572.
186 Id. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Scalia also noted that "[clountless judicial decisions
and legislative enactments have relied on the ancient proposition that a governing majority's
belief that certain sexual behavior is 'immoral and unacceptable' constitutes a rational basis
for regulation." Id. at 589.
187 Id. at 59 o .As one commentator argued, Lawrence was "based solely on moral grounds."
Hermann, supra note i8o, at 91o.
The future of morals laws was previously seriously threatened in Romerv. Evans, in which
the Court struck down an amendment to the Colorado Constitution that prohibited any state
laws or policies permitting homosexuals to assert any claim of "protected status or ... dis-
crimination." Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 62o, 624 (1996). In ruling that there could be no
legitimate purpose for such an amendment and that it was inspired exclusively by animosity
toward homosexuals, the Court basically equated traditional religious disapproval of homo-
sexual conduct with hatred of homosexuals themselves. Id. at 632. The Court also seemed to
dismiss the notion that the amendment could be based on uncertainty about the moral values
involved in the gay rights movement. See id. at 644-45 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing "our
moral heritage").
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labresi agrees: "Lawrence could foreshadow the end of all morals laws...188 If this is the result of Lawrence, it is one that contradicts long-standing
precedent.
Courts have long supported the ability of states to pass morals laws.
Justice Harlan argued that "society is not limited in its objects only to the
physical well-being of the community, but has traditionally concerned itself
with the moral soundness of its people as well., 189 Indeed, there is much
Supreme Court precedent for the ability of states to "legislate morality." 190
Even as recently as Bowers, the Court has acknowledged the validity of
laws based on notions of social morality and that social morality constituted
a legitimate state interest. 9 As the Court warned in Bowers, "[I]f all laws
representing essentially moral choices are to be invalidated under the Due
Process Clause, the courts will be very busy indeed."' '
Laws based on social morality are a necessary compliment or counter-
weight to an individualistic legal culture. An argument exists that a com-
munity is weakened if it can only protect rights and not express any collec-
tive moral judgments defining the duties owed by individuals to society.19
One claim is that the decline of community life in America, precipitated by
an obsessively individualistic orientation, creates a society of self-absorbed
individuals engrossed in the pursuit of private comforts and devoid of any
public-spiritedness.' 94 Similarly, based on the "Platonic ideal ... that the
State exists to promote virtue among its citizens," one scholar has observed
188 Steven G. Calabresi, The Libertarian-Lite Constitutional Order and the Rehnquist Court,
93 GEO. L.J. 1023, 1o44 (2005). The opinion, according to Calabresi, is "one of the most strik-
ingly libertarian opinions the Court has ever issued." Id. As Calabresi argues, "Lawrence is the
Court's latest pronouncement on the scope of substantive due process, and it displaces the
more socially conservative opinion that Chief Justice Rehnquist had written in the assisted
suicide case...." Id.
189 Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 545-46 (I961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (observing that
laws relating to morality "form a pattern so deeply pressed into the substance of our social life
that any Constitutional doctrine in this area must build upon that basis").
190 Christopher J. Gawley, A Requiem for Morality: A Response to Peter M. Cicchino, 30 CAP.
U. L. REv. 711, 719, 728 (2002) (stating that the Court "has consistently accepted notions of
public morality as legitimate government objectives").
I91 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (stating that the law is "based on no-
tions of morality"), overruled by Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558..
192 Id.
193 See FRANcIs FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN 323-24 (1992).
194 See id. at 328. Having the legislature express moral judgments is much less risky or
rigid than the courts doing so because with democratically enacted laws there is always the
potential for change. In the wake of Bowers, for instance, activists used the democratic process
to repeal many state anti-sodomy laws in the United States. See Gawley, supra note 19o, at
754. In addition, personal autonomy may well depend as much on the definition of one's self
in the context of a community as on the definition of one's self apart from the community. Id.
at 758.
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that the public "must have the right and dutsto declare what standards of
morality are to be observed as virtuous ....
A problem with the Court's individual-autonomy-trumps-community-
morals approach in Lawrence is that it has no logical boundaries. The Court
downgrades morals laws but only in connection with those laws pertaining
to sexual activity. Other kinds of moral values seem to present no prob-
lem. For instance, there seems to be no legal problem with a law based on
the public's moral objection to people engaging in sadistic acts of cruelty
toward animals in the privacy of their own homes. Nor is there a problem
with sexual harassment laws that reflect a majoritarian morality.
The Court's privacy doctrine also promotes "the illusion that individu-
als are sovereign jurisdictions, entitled to and able to exercise the most
significant personal liberties without concern for others." Under this illu-
sion, the individual owes no duties to society and does not depend on soci-
ety for his or her physical comfort, emotional satisfaction, personal security,
or liberty; thus, the individual is completely separate from society.
D. Judicial Supremacy and Substantive Due Process
The Due Process Clause has come to serve "as the Supreme Court's 'cho-
sen vessel for the protection of unenumerated rights." Under a substan-
tive due process approach the Court looks to tradition to determine wheth-• l18. s 199
er a right is fundamental. However, tradition can be difficult to define.
As John Hart Ely writes, "people have come to understand that 'tradition'
can be invoked in support of almost any cause."' ° According to Justice
Rehnquist, substantive due process can be used to keep legislatures from
considering important issues of self-governance.2 0' Even though the deter-
mination of whether a specified right is fundamental depends on history
and tradition, there seems to be little logic in determining what-qualifies as
a fundamental freedom, other than the apparent rule that sexual freedom
195 PATRICK DEVLIN,THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS 89 (1965). On a more contemporary
level, Professor Christopher Wolfe argues that the absence of morals laws "may make certain
practices more widespread, and thereby contribute to people's sense that such conduct is
normal or at least unobjectionable, and it may help to shape people's ideas about whether
certain conduct is legitimate, since society withholds any negative public judgment about that
conduct." Christopher Volfe, Public Morality and the Modern Supreme Court, 45 AM. J. JURIS. 65,
68 (2ooo).
196 NAGEL, SUpra note 6, at 149.
197 Isaac J.K. Adams, Growing Pains: The Scope of Substantive Due Process Rights of Parents
ofAdult Children, 57VAND. L. REV. 1883, 1889 (2004).
198 See id.
199 See id. at 189 o.
200 John Hart Ely, Foreward On Discovering Fundamental Values, 92 HARv. L. REV. 5, 39
(978).
201 See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 470 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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is much more likely to receive fundamental rights status than any other
type of activity.
In Washington v. Glucksberg, for instance, the Court refused to designateS 202
physician-assisted suicide as a fundamental right. In upholding Wash-
ington's ban on assisted suicide, the Glucksberg Court explained that just
because "many of the rights and liberties protected by the Due Process
Clause sound in personal autonomy does not warrant the sweeping conclu-
sion that any and all important, intimate, and personal decisions are so pro-
tected."'  Still, this explanation does not satisfactorily address why certain
rights are considered more fundamental than others .2 1
When one compares Glucksberg with Casey and Lawrence, there is a clear
indication of "the heightened status given to sex by substantive due pro-
cess." 05 Under this approach, a person's concepts of existence and the
meaning of life are uniquely tied to his or her sexual activities and prefer-
ences.20° Thus, the sexual nature of a particular human activity or decision
"seems to be more important in determining fundamental rights status
than either history or tradition."' 7
A great many of the Supreme Court's rulings of unconstitutionality are
based on a mere two words in a single constitutional provision: due pro-
cess. Clearly these two simple but vague words do not themselves shed
light on controversial issues of social policy, and clearly the courts cannot
receive direction on deciding such issues by studying these two words.
Consequently, the Due Process Clause has become a means of transferring
policymaking power from legislatures to the courts.
A constitutional republic cannot guarantee personal happiness; it can
only provide for what the Framers called "public happiness. ' °8 This is
achieved by creating a constitutional structure that guarantees every per-
202 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 735 (1997) (rejecting due process challenges
to Washington's law banning assisted suicide).
203 Id.
204 See Garry, A Different Model, supra note 174, at 192 ("[Tihe underlying questions re-
main: How is assisted suicide so much less of a fundamental right than assisted fetal termina-
tion? Why is sodomy protected but not prostitution? Why doesn't the right of privacy extend
to polygamy or the use of recreational drugs?").
205 Id.
2o6 Planned Parenthood of Se. Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
207 Id. In Lawrence, however, Justice Scalia argued that the Constitution is not commit-
ted to substantive protection of sexual liberty against government regulation and that sodomy
reform is a matter of moral judgment better left to state political processes. Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 602-05 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
For a discussion of how economic substantive due process has been rejected and of
how this rejection discredits the Court's current use of substantive due process, see Garry, A
Different M odel, supra note 174, at 194-96.
208 Bradford P. Wilson, Separation of Powers and Judicial Review, in SEPARATION OF POWERS
AND Gooo GOVERNMENT 63, 8S (Bradford P. Wilson & Peter W. Schramm, eds., 1994).
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son an equal right to participate in the democratic process free from the
tyranny of government.'0 9 The weakness of substantive due process is that
it tries to achieve personal happiness at the expense of public happiness. It
places within the courts issues that should be addressed in the democratic
arena.2 1 0 Justice Kennedy repeated this theme when he said that "[slociety
has to recognize that it has to confront hard decisions in neutral, rational,
dispassionate debate .... And not just leave it to the courts .... That's a
weak society that leaves it to courts."'211
IV. A STIFLING OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS
The Court's monopolization of individual-rights issues and its use of sub-
stantive due process calls into question the proper balance between legisla-
tive and judicial power. In 1824, Chief Justice John Marshall expressed the
prevailing view of the Court's role: "Judicial power is never exercised for
the purpose of giving effect to the will of the Judge; always for the purpose
,,212
of giving effect to the will of the Legislature .... Marshall also sug-
gested that, on doubtful questions of constitutionality, political decisions
"ought not to be lightly disregarded," if not given decisive weight."'
Some scholars have argued that the Court should not be given the ex-
clusive job of constitutional interpretation. In The People Themselves, Larry
Kramer argues that American constitutional history reflects a struggle be-
tween the legal elite and ordinary people for control over the Constitu-
2l4
tion. Kramer believes the people should have a role in determining the
Constitution, and he insists that Madison "never wavered in his belief that
final authority to resolve disagreements over [the Constitution's] meaning
209 See id.
2 10 See JOHN HARTELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDIcIAL REVIEW 85-88
(1980) (arguing that an over-active judiciary can exert a suffocating influence on the demo-
cratic process). Only when that process is broken should the courts get involved, such as when
the process does not adequately represent minority interests. See id. at 86. It follows that the
political process should otherwise be relied upon to fix bad or undesirable laws. For instance,
since women make up more than half the voting population, there is no structural bias against,
or impediment to, the issue of abortion being decided through the political process.
211 Jeffrey Rosen, TheAgonizer, NEW YORKER, Nov. I I, 1996, at 90.
212 Osborn v. Bank of the U.S., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 866 (1824), overruled in part as
statedin daho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261 (1997); see also CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE
PEOPLE AND THE COURT: JUDICIAL REVIEW IN A DEMOCRACY 159-6o (1960) (quoting Osborn for
the same point).
213 McCulloch v. Maryland, i7 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 401 (1819).
214 LARRY D. KRAMER, THlE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004). Kramer claims that advocates of judicial supremacy are anti-demo-
cratic elites who believe "that popular politics is by nature dangerous and arbitrary; that 'tyr-
anny of the majority' is a pervasive threat; that a democratic constitutional order is therefore
precarious and highly vulnerable; and that substantial checks on politics are necessary lest
things fall apart." Id. at 243.
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must always rest exclusively with the people. '" 5 In Madison's view, the
judiciary was never to be the supreme judge of constitutional meaning.16
According to Kramer, the regime of judicial supremacy, based on a wide-
spread belief that the Supreme Court is the ultimate constitutional author-
ity, has sapped much of the life from democratic politics."1 7 He dates the
victory of judicial supremacy back to the Warren Court of the 1960s, when
"the principle of judicial supremacy came to monopolize constitutional
theory and discourse," at least in the area of individual rights."" Thus, he
disagrees with those who claim that the Court has been the supreme voice
in constitutional interpretation throughout most of the nation's history.9
A host of other constitutional scholars have likewise addressed the con-
nection between judicial review and the political process. Cass Sunstein
presents an argument supporting the theory that judicial minimalism pro-
motes democratic deliberation. Mark Tushnet calls for the near total
abolition of judicial review; he argues that other branches of government
could adequately interpret the Constitution"' and that the Court has its
own imperialistic incentives to expand constitutional control over Con-
222gress.
In Glucksberg, the Court recognized the dangers that substantive due
process posed, and it refused to transfer an important issue from the po-
litical process to the judiciary. The Court noted that "[tlhroughout the
Nation, Americans are engaged in an earnest and profound debate about
the morality, legality, and practicality of physician-assisted suicide. 223 The
Court further stated: "Our holding permits this debate to continue, as it
should in a democratic society. 22 4 Substantive due process cases require
2I5 Id. at 47.
2I6 See id. at 146-47; see also Daniel J. Hulsebosch, Bringing the People Back In, 8o N.Y.U.
L. REV. 653, 678 (2005) (discussing Kramer's argument).
217 See generally KRAMER, supra note 214.
2I8 Id. at 224. The notion of judicial supremacy took hold in the middle of the twentieth
century when the Court, after having given up monitoring structure-of-government issues
during the New Deal, became active in protecting individual rights. See id. at 2i9-20.
219 Id. at 207-08. Kramer's views are supported by John Marshall and Joseph Story,
both of whom considered Congress "to have the primary role in interpreting the Constitution
and adapting it to changing circumstances." Robert J. Kaczorowski, Popular Constitutionalism
Versus Justice in Plainclothes: Reflections from History, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1415, 1425 (2005). The
Court's power of judicial review permitted it to nullify acts of Congress only in very limited
circumstances where Congress had clearly exercised constitutionally prohibited powers. Id.
220 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT ATlME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT
ix, 132 (1999).
221 See generally MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS
(1999).
222 See Mark Tushnet, Two Versions of Judicial Supremacy, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 945,
950-52 (1998).
223 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 735 (I997).
224 Id.
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the courts not just to judge the specifics of individual cases but to lay down
a general rule that will govern a whole array of cases. The question is where
the lines should be drawn between privacy and social morality or commu-
nity values, and this question-the matter of balancing interests to arrive at
social policy-is best addressed by the legislative branch."'
For controversial issues that "roil the nation," the Court should not
impose national resolutions but should instead remand the issues to the
democratic process to flush out all the viewpoints, educate the polity, and
226
reach a compromised consensus. In the early abortion cases, for instance,
the Court prematurely removed from the political process one of the most
difficult and divisive public law debates of American history."2 7 Because
state legislatures all over the country were beginning to rethink their abor-
tion laws in the early 1970s the Court should have denied review in Roe so
that the issue could ripen. Furthermore, abortion does not represent a
minority right that only the courts can protect. Women constitute a voting
majority, and there is no procedural reason why the political process should229
not take account of their interests. For this reason, John Hart Ely argued
that it would be more legitimate for women's rights reforms to win in the
legislative rather than the judicial process.23
The centralizing tendency of the Supreme Court and its corrosive ef-
fect on decentralized democratic processes can be seen in the Court's re-
cent death-penalty decisions. In Roperv. Simmons, the Court struck down
a state's imposition of the death penalty for convicted murderers underr - 231
the age of eighteen. At issue in Roper was the fate of seventeen-year-old
Christopher Simmons, who had been sentenced to death for the murder
of Shirley Crook.13' The evidence showed that Simmons had plotted the
murder by assuring friends that "they could 'get away with it' because they
were minors." 33 They broke into the home of Ms. Crook, kidnapped her,
225 TOM CAMPBELL, SEPARATION OF POWERS IN PRACTICE 22-23 (2004). This is particu-
larly true because the judiciary "is at a disadvantage in trying to ascertain facts not of the kind
presented as evidence in trials." Id. at 22.
226 William N. Eskridge, Jr., Pluralism and Distrust: How Courts Can Support Democracy by
Lowering the Stakes of Politics, 114 YALE L.J. 1279, 1283 (2005).
227 Id. at 1282.
228 Id. at 1312-13.
229 See ELY, supra note 2 io, at 164-69 (discussing the voting power of women, though not
addressing the topic of abortion specifically).
230 Id. at 167-68. As another example, the Court's centralized Establishment Clause
jurisprudence hurts the political process because it restricts rather than opens the operation
of the process by foreclosing certain types of political activity and certain types of substan-
tive government policies. The Court's doctrines form a barrier to political participation and
expression.
231 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005).
232 Id. at 556-58.
233 Id. at 556.
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drove her to a railroad bridge, tied her hands and feet with electrical wire,
and threw her off."4 Afterward, Simmons boasted that he had killed Ms.
Crook "because the bitch seen my face. ' 35 In recommending the death
penalty, the jury rejected Simmons's claim that his age should mitigate the
vileness of the murder.
2 36
Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, held that the death penalty for
people under the age of eighteen violated the "evolving standards of de-
cency that mark the progress of a maturing society.""' According to Jus-
tice Kennedy, American society had reached a "national consensus" against
capital punishment for juveniles, even though twenty states still permitted
such punishment."B However, the terms "evolving standards of decency"
and "national consensus" obviously carry subjective meanings.
Undoubtedly, the question of capital punishment for seventeen-year-
olds is a wrenching moral question; and indeed, of the thirty-eight states
that permit the death penalty, eighteen states forbid the execution of con-
victed murderers under the age of eighteen. 3 9 But, the issue is how this
moral question should be decided in a democracy: by the expressed view
of democratic legislatures or by a mandate from a nine-justice Supreme
Court? Moreover, the Court's justification for its decision rested on rath-
er undemocratic and extra-constitutional sources. By citing international
opinion on this subject, the Court selectively chose foreign laws and pro-
nouncements in which the American peo~ple never had any input and to
which they never expressed any consent. For instance, Justice Kennedy
cited the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, which the
United States has never signed, and the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, which the United States signed subject to a reserva-
tion regarding the provision that prohibits the death penalty for juvenile
offenders.
Aside from the Court's assumption of a legislative role and its reliance
on international law, Roper also violated basic federalism principles. No
matter how one may feel about the death penalty, it is part of the crimi-
nal justice system administered by state governments. The federalist
scheme of criminal justice gives the states primary control over all aspects
234 Id. at 556-57.
235 Id. at 557.
236 Id. at 558.
237 Id. at 561 (citingTrop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, ioo-oi (1958) (plurality opinion)).
238 Id. at 564.
239 Id.
240 See id. at 575-76 (discussing numerous international authorities in support of the
Court's decision).
241 Id. at 576.
242 Historically, crime prevention and punishment is a function of the states rather than
the federal government. See, e.g., Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 445 (1992).
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of criminal law-including the defining of crimes and the levying of punish-243
ment. Consequently, federal courts should be hesitant to intrude upon a
state's moral priorities in sentencing.2 " Nevertheless, as demonstrated in
Roper, and previously in Atkins v. Virginia, the Supreme Court has ignored
this federalism aspect of criminal punishment.
In Roper, the Court stated that its decision was necessitated by an appar-
ent national consensus on standards of decency.246 This argument directly
contradicts the very essence and purpose of federalism. Uniform national
approaches are contrary to the spirit of federalism, which in fact encourages
each state to deviate from other states. 4 1 Just as due process is not violated
every time a state finds itself in the minority, "[t]he Eighth Amendment is
not violated every time a State reaches a conclusion different from a major-
ity of its sisters over how best to administer its criminal laws.
''
1
4
8
Not only does the Court intrude on federalism principles when it de-
cides matters of state criminal law, but it frequently engages in the type of
policymaking that is the province of state legislatures. In striking down the
death penalty for mentally retarded defendants, the Court in Atkins came to
a conclusion about the deterrent value of the death penalty, reasoning that
someone whose intellectual abilities are impaired cannot fully understand
the meaning of the death penalty and hence cannot be deterred by it.149
While this may be a reasonable assumption, it is a judgment that should be
made by state legislators. Deterrence is a matter of policy best suited to
the fact-finding process used by legislative bodies.
The exclusionary rule is another example of how the Court engages in
legislative-type policymaking to uphold a centralized mandate of individ-250
ual rights. In Dickerson v. United States, the Court reaffirmed the Warren
243 See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 824 (1991). For a statement on federalism in
the non-criminal context of civil commitment proceedings, see Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S.
418,431 (1979) ("The essence of federalism is that states must be free to develop a variety of
solutions to problems and not be forced into a common, uniform mold.").
244 See Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 510 (1995).
245 See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (holding that execution of a mentally
retarded offender violates the Eighth Amendment).
246 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564 (2005).
247 A similar contradiction of the basic principles of federalism occurred in U.S. Term
Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 783 (1995) (striking down a state law imposing term
limits for congressional representatives of that state). Reflecting a nationalistic viewpoint,
the Court seemed to indicate distaste for the dual sovereignty aspect of federalism, implying
that citizens could only have one type of loyalty-to either a state or the nation, but not both.
As Robert Nagel observed, "[i]f the Term Limits majority is committed to the idea that local
interests and divided loyalties are undesirable just because they can reflect different values
and interests than those that prevail at the national level, its opinion is powerful confirmation
that the justices are instinctively opposed to federalism." NAGEL, supra note 6, at 76.
248 Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447,464 (1984).
249 See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 32 1.
25o Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 432 (2000).
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Court's decision in Miranda v. Arizona."' Just as the Court ruled in Atkins
that the threat of a death penalty would not deter the mentally retarded
from committing heinous criminal acts, the Court in Miranda made a policy
judgment that the exclusionary rule-the rule precluding the government
from using evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth or Fifth Amend-., . 252
ments-would in fact deter the police from committing such violations.
Thus, in focusing on protecting individual rights, Miranda produced a na-
tion-wide mandate on deterrence that should otherwise have come from
the legislative arena.
The exclusionary rule is grounded on assumptions about how best to
deter certain kinds of police misconduct.5 3 However, a determination of
deterrent value is one that calls for the kind of decision-making that is
characteristic of the legislative branch and is supported empirically ratherj , 254
than doctrinally. Legislatures can hold hearings on all the various steps
that can or should be taken to deter police misconduct, as well as the rela-
tive costs of those steps, and how much deterrence is actually sufficient or
necessary. Aside from these policy matters, there is the question of wheth-
er the exclusionary rule is even constitutionally compelled. In Arizona v.
Evans, the Court conceded that the exclusionary rule had no explicit basis
155in the Fourth Amendment. And yet, an attempt by Congress to statuto-
rily undo Miranda was rejected by the Supreme Court in Dickerson v. United
States.56
251 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
252 See id. at 444, 478-79 (holding statements obtained in violation of the Fifth
Amendment are inadmissible in a criminal trial). As Tom Campbell states, "[to determine
what rule of policy will best deter constitutional violations is legislature-like." CAMPBELL,
supra note 225, at 103.
253 See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 916 (1984) ("[Tlhe exclusionary rule is de-
signed to deter police misconduct .... ").
254 See CAMPBELL, supra note 225, at 5 (stating that a deterrence decision "calls for the
weighing of interests, at which the legislative branch, not the judicial branch, excels").
255 SeeArizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 10 (1995).
256 Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2ooo). The Court has also assumed leg-
islative functions in connection with race issues. In Gruterv. Bollinger, in upholding the law
school's affirmative action admissions plan, the Court selectively gave different treatment to
an academic institution than it had previously given to other kinds of institutions in connec-
tion with affirmative action matters. Compare Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), with
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (striking down the city's affirmative
action plan for awarding construction contracts), and Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515
U.S. 200 (1995) (holding strict scrutiny applied to federal government's use of racial classifica-
tion in providing highway contracts). Furthermore, in Grutter, the Court made a legislative-
type decision insofar as it implied a twenty-five year deadline for racial preference programs.
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306,343 (2003). Professor Campbell also demonstrates how the
Court, in establishing liability tests under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, is engaging in
legislative functions. See CAMPBELL, supra note 225, at 159-65.
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Having grown accustomed to bypassing or trumping the political pro-
cess in the name of individual rights, the courts have come to blatantly
intrude upon the legislative process in ways not even connected to tradi-
tional individual rights issues. For instance, a judge ordered New York City
to spend an additional five billion dollars every year to ensure that students
receive a sound, basic education."' Not only did the judge proclaim a spe-
cific amount of money to be spent, but he even designated how it was to
be spent-for example, shrinking class sizes, increasing laboratories, and
expanding libraries.""8
In January 2005, the Kansas Supreme Court ruled that even though ed-
ucation spending in Kansas had increased since 1989, the current spending
on education was inadequate. 59 Consequently, the court ordered the legis-
lature to increase funding levels.' 6° This order would very likely result in
a tax increase, which is a function strictly belonging to the legislature.
Whereas many courts have abstained from dictating education fund-
ing because they see the area as one entrusted exclusively to the elected
261branches, other courts have reasoned that once a legislature creates a
school system, the judiciary is empowered to ensure that the system is
"fair."26 2 In Missouri v. Jenkins, the Court upheld a lower court order that
a local school district pay for the implementation of a magnet-school de-
segregation plan.16  This decision was the first time the Supreme Court
upheld a direct judicial mandate to a legislative body to raise funds for
a specific purpose, and serves as a major precedent for courts across the
country to enforce their decrees. In another example of judicial intrusion
into the workings of elected bodies, the Court refused to terminate judicial
control of a school district that had been going on for more than thirty years
as a result of a desegregation case.'64
Aside from its increasing assumption of legislative-type functions, the
Court also seems willing to use its individual rights jurisprudence to single
out the political process for special handicaps. For instance, even though
the Court has given constitutional protection to animated cyberspace child
257 Greg Winter, Judge Orders Billions in Aid to City Schools, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2005, at
Ai.
258 Id.
259 Montoy v. State, 120 P.3d 3o6 (Kan. 2005).
26o Id.
261 See, e.g., Comm. for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178, 1197 (Ill. 1996); City of
Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40, 56 (R.I. 1995).
262 Aaron Jay Saiger, Constitutional Partnership and the States, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1439,
1454 (2005).
263 Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 276, 290 (1989).
264 See Bd. of Educ. of Okla. City Pub. Sch. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 240, 250 (1991).
The Court refused to terminate court supervision over the school district even though the
district court found that the school district had complied with the desegregation decree. Id.
at 247-5 1.
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pornography, it has held that certain political ads broadcast before elec-• 265
tions can be banned. Using an individual rights mandate to drain power
from the political arena, the Court in Republican Party v. Rutan ruled that
the use of various political patronage practices violated the First Amend-266
ment. Critics argued this ruling would further weaken "already feeble• . ,267
state and local party organizations." Since the 1960s, the Court has also
significantly narrowed the political question doctrine, which states that the
Supreme Court will not adjudicate certain issues that are better left to the
more political branches' 68 whenever an issue of individual rights might be
involved 69
The increasing role of the judiciary in American politics is not the sole
work of the courts, but rather has been accomplished with at least the pas-
sive acquiescence of the public."' In Democracy by Decree. What Happens
When Courts Run Government, Professors Ross Sandier and David Schoen-
brod illustrate how various public interest groups have used the courts to
pursue a policy agenda that they were not able to achieve in the legisla-
tive arena.2 7'According to Sandier and Schoenbrod, the courts are a favored
policy venue for several reasons.272 First, the judicial process is not as long
273or messy as the legislative process. Second, since the courts tend to focus
265 It is highly ironic that a Court that is so protective of flag burning, soft-core pornog-
raphy on cable television, and commercial speech would end up being so cavalier about what
seems to have been a regulation of core political speech in McConnell. See McConnell v. FEC,
540 U.S. 93 (2003) (upholding various campaign finance restrictions).
266 Republican Party v. Rutan, 497 U.S. 62, 64-65 (1990).
267 See WALKER, supra note 5, at 196. The decline of "traditional political parties as me-
diating and moderating institutions within the federal system" further contributes to the cen-
tralizing role of the Court. Id. at 251. Years earlier, the Court ruled that patronage systems
violate the Free Speech Clause, since to replace a public employee because of that person's
political affiliation is to penalize that person's political beliefs. See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S.
347 (976).
268 See, e.g., Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 450 (1939); Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. I,
42-43 ( 1849).
269 See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969) (declining to apply the political ques-
tion doctrine in case challenging a resolution that excluded a member-elect from being seated
in the House of Representatives); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (declining to apply the
political question doctrine where voters claimed a state apportionment statute denied them
equal protection).
270 It may also be due to the increasing role played by the media in society. The elec-
tronic media may well favor and hence highlight the speed and drama of court decisions.
271 Ross SANDLER & DAVID SCHOENBROD, DEMOCRACY BY DECREE: WHAT HAPPENS WHEN
COURTS RUN GOVERNMENT 6-9, 26,31 (2003).
272 See generally id.
273 However, while some may think that the courts provide stability and a final settle-
ment to controversial social issues, this may not be the case. In Casey, the Court even ac-
knowledged that its abortion decisions had not provided settlement to the issue: "19 years
after our holding... [in] Roev. Wade,... that definition of liberty is still questioned." Planned
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992).
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on individual rights, a judicial agenda can be pursued by a small minority,
or even by a single person or group. Third, there seems to exist a mistrust
of legislative bodies to handle controversial moral and cultural questions.4
Fourth, a court ruling can be enforced immediately, and noncompliance can
be punished with a contempt order. Thus, under a regime of judicial activ-
ism, social policymaking has come increasingly from judicially enforceable
rights, which although arising out of legislation, serve to ultimately trump
the legislative process.
The courts' increasingly legislative role is perhaps being fueled by a
public which has lost faith in the democratic process and by judges who
have lost faith in our constitutional norms, as reflected in the rising tenden-
cy of the Court to rely on international law for its controversial individual-
rights decisions."' In Lawrence, for instance, the Court cited a decision
of the European Court of Human Rights to support the finding that the
privacy right to engage in homosexual sodomy is constitutionally protected
• . 276 ..
in the United States. According to the Court, this right is "an integral
part of human freedom in many other countries," and hence it is part of
a scheme of ordered liberty."' In Atkins, the Court used the opinions of
the "world community" to help establish "evolving standards of decency"• . . 278
which the death penalty at issue violated. Likewise, in Thompson v. Okla-
homa, Justice Stevens referred to international standards regarding capital
279punishment of criminals under sixteen years of age. Criticizing this use
of international law, Richard Posner raises the problem of citing laws that
come from non-democratic nations: "To cite foreign law as authority is to..
. suppose fantastically that the world's judges constitute a single, elite com-
munity of wisdom and conscience." 0
274 As Robert Nagel theorizes, there may also be a fear of the conflict and uncertainty
caused by a full and open democratic airing of such issues. He argues that the legislative
branch will only assume responsibility for these issues when society, as well as the courts, stop
viewing the conflicts caused by such issues as akin to anarchy, chaos or social warfare. NAGEL,
supra note 6, at 11, 99, 106-1i.
275 For those who rely on international law to help interpret our Constitution, constitu-
tional truth depends not just on our national experience, but also on global realities. See Roger
P. Alford, In Search of a Theory for Constitutional Comparativism, 52 UCLA L. REv. 639, 695-96
(2005) (discussing Justice Breyer's approach of "transnational pragmatism").
276 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573, 576 (2003).
277 Id. at 577.
278 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304,312, 316 n.z (zooz).
279 Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830 (1988).
28o Richard Posner, No Thanks, We Already Have Our Own Laws, LEGAL AFr., July-Aug.
2004, at 40,42.
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V. CONCLUSION
The so-called federalism revolution, in which the Court has tried to revi-
talize a more decentralized, non-national political process, has not spread
to the area of individual rights. Even though the decentralized, federalist
structure of the Constitution was intended to preserve individual liberty,
the Court's attempt to restore that structure has not translated into a re-
treat from its centralized mandates on individual rights. There has been
no lessening of judicial activism regarding substantive individual rights and
no increasing reliance on the Constitution's structural provisions for the
protection of liberty. Indeed, the Rehnquist Court reversed none of the
significant individual rights decisions of the Warren and Burger Courts. To
the contrary, individual-rights issues have become the most intensely fol-
lowed judicial issues of the time, and evidence of this can be seen in the
heightened role that privacy rights played in the Supreme Court nomina-
tion of John Roberts."8 '
There is also an indication that even the Court's limited-scope federal-
ism revival may have stalled. In Gonzalez v. Raich, the Court held that a
federal law, the Controlled Substances Act of 1970, precluded any state
legislature from authorizing the medical use of marijuana by doctors and
patients within its state. As Justice Thomas argued in his dissent, this
283was a decision that went against federalism principles. If Congress could
use the Commerce Clause to regulate doctors' prescriptions of marijuana
to the sick, according to Justice Thomas, "then it can regulate virtually
anything-and the Federal Government is no longer one of limited and
enumerated powers."' 84 As Thomas noted, the American federalist system
should allow states "to decide for themselves how to safeguard the health
and welfare of their citizens."
' ' 15
Over the course of the last decade and a half, it was often predicted
that the Court was preparing to "attack the 'core' of the modern regulatory
. . 286
state" in its campaign to revive federalism. But this never happened.
z81 Adam Liptak, Privacy Views: Roberts Argued Hard for Others, N.Y TIMES, Aug. 8, 2005,
atAi.
282 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. I (2005). As one commentator noted, the medical mari-
juana case marks "the end of the 'federalism revolution."' Ramesh Ponnuru, The End of the
Federalism Revolution ... If Such a Revolution Had Ever Occurred, NAT'L REV., July 4, 2005, at
33.
283 Raich, 545 U.S. at 65-69 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The federalism issues in Raich re-
quired real commitment. Although conservatives usually favor federalism, they also want
the federal government to crack down on illegal drugs; liberals, on the other hand, are often
leery of federalism, as well as of harsh penalties against individual freedom to use marijuana
in certain circumstances.
284 Id. at 58.
285 Id. at 74.
z86 Ponnuru, supra note 282, at 33, 34.
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Instead of attacking centralized government at its core, according to crit-
ics, the Court tended to hit it at the edges in ways that did not make a
significant difference. 87 Even more importantly, the Court never imposed
serious constraints on itself and its centralizing jurisprudence of individual
rights. As demonstrated by the substantive due process cases, the Court
did not accompany its political federalism, in which it tried to limit the
power of Congress, with a moral federalism that allowed states to develop
their own social and moral policies free of judicial dictate.
Perhaps the Court has been able to exert such a centralizing influence288
because we have lost faith in the democratic process. According to Mary
Ann Glendon, "[miuch judicial activism in recent years ... [is] attributable
to a lack of confidence in our state legislatures." 2 89 We rely on the courts,
just as we did on administrative agencies during the New Deal, to decide
the important matters of public interest.'90 Furthermore, we rely on the
courts to make the moral judgments that used to flow up from society and
culture through the democratic process. Given the increasing moral com-
plexity that necessarily accompanies a more individualistic and libertarian
culture, society may be looking for some clear-cut, definitive direction from
the Court, as if its far-off centralization confers upon it a greater sense of au-
thority. Perhaps in this way, we have become dependent on the Supreme
Court to tell us how to live and what to think.
Rights and liberty have come to be seen as strictly judge-made, uncon-
nected and maybe even antagonistic to the democratic process. Conse-
quently, whenever rights are involved, courts can immediately bypass the
political process, as if the workings of self-government cannot be trusted
to reach the right result. This only tends to cut off democratic debate and
dialogue on such matters as individual liberty and cultural values, which in
turn only further erodes majoritarian rule.
With its substantive due process rulings, the Court has cast the Consti-
tution as a Solomon-like source of wisdom on the moral truths of life. But
the Constitution is not a moral edict, it is a political document. The Con-
stitution simply establishes a structure for majority rule, and because the
Constitution confers this freedom of self-government, it allows much that
is foolish and ill-advised. It sets the ground rules for making democratic
decisions; it does not state what those decisions should be. Consequently,
287 See id. at 33.
z88 The Supreme Court has served as a force that has been centralizing. Since the
early sixties, its jurisprudence regarding the scope of Fourteenth Amendment protections,
in particular, has "produced a cumulative effect that was highly centripetal." WALKER, Supra
note 5, at 315.
289 MARY ANN GLENDON, supra note 32, at 162.
29o During the New Deal, "the faith in bureaucratic administration was based on the
ability of regulators to discern the public interest and to promote, though indirectly and
through their very insulation, democratic goals." Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the
New Deal, ioi HAtv. L. REV. 421,444 (1987).
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the Court should not use its powers of constitutional interpretation to do
what the Constitution does not do. The Constitution sets a culture of free-
dom, but it is up to democracy to set a culture of morality. As Chief Justice
Rehnquist once said, "in the long run it is the majority who will determine
what the constitutional rights of the minority are.",91
The constitutional provisions for the federal judiciary are relatively
meager. The Constitution does not actually create the federal judiciary as
an institution; it only creates the judicial power, leaving most of the institu-
tional details-such as kinds and numbers of courts, number of justices on
the Supreme Court, appellate jurisdiction, and the regulation of the judicial
process-to the discretion of Congress. There is also no explicit provision
in the Constitution for the power of judicial review itself. In sum, this
is hardly the kind of constitutional foundation one would expect for an
institution that some now insist is meant to be the moral guardian of the
republic.
291 Linda Greenhouse, William H. Rehnquist, Architect of Conservative Court, Dies at 80,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2005, atAi6.

